Kineman, J. 1997. Theory of Autevolution
Epistemology – II
Criteria for evaluating worldviews
In this section I present and examine what I believe to be a complete
set of criteria for determining the value of any new worldview.
This set of criteria is based on an epistemological synthesis
(presented previously). At the end of each section, I summarize
the implications for autevolution, which has been constructed
to satisfy all five criteria.
Criterion 1: Parsimony
Criterion 2: Universality
Criterion 3: Crisis Resolution
Criterion 4: Consistency
Criterion 5: Formalization
Criterion 6: Fruitfulness
Criterion 1: Parsimony
Parsimony, or “Ockham’s razor,” is an appeal to concepts
that improve our understanding of nature through the use of simplifying
assumptions. If we find a more parsimonious view of nature, operating
from that view will make description and explanation of phenomena
simpler (once the new idea is understood well enough to be used).
Explanations should then lead to more revealing questions and
useful applications to other phenomena.
Various forms of parsimony can apply to descriptive models (e.g.
characterizations should be as simple as possible in regard to
their intended use), to theory development (explanations), and
to critical assumptions that might make up a worldview. In the
latter case, the goal is to provide a more useful thought system,
recognizing that a simplifying assumption may not seem simple
when first perceived from a different worldview. As Niels Bohr (1961)
stated:
“Only by experience itself do we come to recognize those
laws which grant us a comprehensive view of the diversity of phenomena.
As our knowledge becomes wider, we must always be prepared, therefore,
to expect alterations in the points of view best suited for the
ordering of our experience. In this connection we must remember,
above all, that, as a matter of course, all new experience makes
its appearance within the frame of our customary points of view
and forms of perception” (which, we might add, may be
deceiving).
A correct use of parsimony requires that one judge by results,
not by appearance. Parsimony, in evaluating a new worldview,
must be established by experience with the new view itself, a
process which may involve long periods of development. An often
cited example in the history of physics is the parsimonious nature
of Newton’s laws of motion (based on the concept of force) in
contrast to Ptolemy’s increasingly elaborate mathematical description
of a geocentric solar system. In regard to building theory,
it should thus be considered parsimonious to seek deeper and more
inclusive levels of causality.
Historically, natural science became
“simplified” by avoiding problematic fields such as
psychology. This simplified the job by reducing its scope, however
it did not give us a more parsimonious explanation of nature.
Similarly, scientific disciplines are sometimes described as complementary,
but this does not mean that their separation is parsimonious.
The principle of “complementarity”
that has been found to be parsimonious in physics is proposed
as a fundamental and necessary property of nature (the uncertainty
principle); whereas the complementary separation
between two theories or disciplines (say between psychology and
biology) or among Thompson’s family of interacting theories (Thompson, 1989)
in evolution and ecology, is not a requirement of nature, but
has to do with our lack of knowledge and to different assumptions
or theory elements. The “family of theories” concept
is not chosen out of consideration of parsimony, but rather expedience,
to accommodate a multiplicity of perspectives. The realist perspective
considered here implies that integration of theories or worldviews
(when achievable) involves a more parsimonious and fundamental
understanding of nature.
Application to autevolution:
Autevolution, as presented here, seeks explanation in terms of
fundamental causality and attempts to construct new theoretical
foundations by integrating theories from several disciplines and
worldviews. In so doing, it seeks a more parsimonious understanding
of general phenomena.
Criterion 2: Universality
The search for universal principles as the basis for explanation
is essential to the development of a general theory in the realist
tradition. Within a given worldview, the search for ever deeper
levels of explanation (i.e. causation), and thus the successive
formalization of more universal principles, extends theory to
new situations by making it less conditional on presupposed limits.
If one seeks universal and causal explanations within a
worldview, rigorous development must ultimately challenge the
universality of the worldview itself. On the other hand, solutions
that are designed to be system-dependent tend to reinforce their
own theoretical foundations and provide less pressure to modify
original assumptions.
Application to autevolution:
Autevolution, as defined earlier, is universal in that it develops
theory on the basis of a principle that is assumed to be present
in all life.
Criterion 3: Crisis Resolution
As history implies, the relentless pursuit of a consistent and
complete body of theoretical knowledge (phase A of figure 1)
can eventually lead to a “crisis” in scientific thought
(Kuhn, 1970). Such crises
can be defined by one or more apparent or specific paradoxes (i.e.
paradox that is specific to the given worldview). A specific paradox
consists of at least two inescapable theoretical conclusions that
are mutually exclusive, given our original assumptions about nature.
Paradoxes in thought or theory, whether consciously identified
or not, form the psychological basis for re-evaluating assumptions
both in everyday thought and during major scientific “revolutions”.
As an example, paradoxes develop from Euclidean geometry when
it is applied over large distances, due to the curvature of space
(or in geodesy, due to the curvature of the Earth). Such crises
are perceived when theory becomes incompatible with our concept
of a unitary reality (as with two logically contradictory conclusions).
However, if we do not actively challenge the foundations of
theory, we may not discover their paradoxical elements. For
example, paradoxical views mentioned earlier between biological
theories are often ignored. Wave-particle complementarity, on
the other hand, is no longer paradoxical because we have accepted
this duality within our view of nature. Paradoxes are thus a result
of present theoretical contradictions and an epistemological realism
that claims such contradictions should not exist.
Paradox was a particular interest of Niels Bohr (1961)
and was prominent in the many discussions between Bohr and Einstein.
In fact, it is safe to say that the identification and resolution
of paradox became an intentional characteristic in the progress
of physics beginning with Einstein (e.g. the EPR Paradox,
Schrödinger’s Cat Paradox, Twin Paradox, etc.). The exercise
of analyzing paradox was essential in clarifying one’s theory
(or worldview), or overthrowing it by proving a logical inconsistency.
An excellent description of the purposeful use of paradox as part
of the scientific method was presented by Albert Einstein (1916)
in his layman’s explanation of special and general relativity.
Einstein introduced the reasoning that led to his formulation
of special relativity theory — a new worldview — by pointing
out “the apparent incompatibility of the law of propagation
of light” (i.e. constant speed in a vacuum) “with
the principle of relativity” (i.e. that the laws of nature
are unchanged at constant velocities). Physics had reached this
inconsistency after a painstaking pursuit of traditional scientific
experimentation and hypothesis testing, with agreement among the
scientific community that the resulting paradox was logically
unresolvable within the classical worldview. At this point,
the essence of solving the dilemma was not to reject one of the
alternatives, as in testing hypotheses, but to accept both and
revise our assumptions about the nature of the universe. In
Einstein’s own words:
“As the result of an analysis of the physical conceptions
of time and space” [i.e. the formulation of his new worldview]
“it became evident that in reality there is not the least
incompatibility between the principle of relativity and the law
of propagation of light, and that by systematically holding
fast to both these laws, a logically rigid theory could be arrived
at“ [emphasis added].
This was the theory of Special Relativity, and it required changing
our assumptions about the geometry of space and time. The process,
so beautifully understood and illustrated by Einstein, is an essential
process for every architect of new scientific thought, whether
it is done consciously or by intuition.
This implies that developing a new worldview is a very different
process from building consistent theory. In building causally-related
theory, reasonable alternatives within a given framework can be
established and selectively excluded based on evidence. Successional
and more advancing worldviews, however, require altering the assumptions;
and advances to a more inclusive view are made most reliably by
unifying empirically confirmed but logically contradictory conclusions
(paradox) that appear within the former worldview. Thus, this
latter process is one of inclusion, because the new view is now
able to explain how both sides of the apparent paradox can be
seen as true. In forming a new worldview, we are considering
a change in basic assumptions, brought on by a logical failure
of the previous view.
The value of demonstrating paradox is also illustrated by the
noticeable lack of such demonstrations in pseudoscientific theories
(theories invented without appropriate epistemological criteria).
With two opposite processes operating within the scientific method
(selection and unification) if there is no clear way of deciding
when to apply each, science easily degenerates into chaos because
revolutions are no longer required to address a genuine issue
(i.e. they are solutions without a demonstrated problem). The
criterion of crisis resolution establishes both the need for new
directions and the likelihood that the line of reasoning to which
one is led will be useful. The search for theoretical paradoxes
should be relentless.
As the model indicates (Figure 1),
paradox can also appear when previously separate theories, worldviews,
or disciplines are combined. The process of disciplinary or worldview
integration can identify logical conflicts between interacting
theories, which can stimulate unification.
Application to autevolution:
I mentioned earlier that autevolution must deal with paradoxes
between current views of behavioral ecology and mechanical evolution,
paradoxes between psychological theories (concepts of mind or
psyche) and material theories (determinism), and the artificial
separation of disciplines which avoids dealing with these contradictions.
As long as these perspectives are considered separate or merely
complementary, no crisis will be perceived; but if they are combined
(in a realist context), one must resolve the issue of interdependence
between organism and environment, between form and function, and
between free-will or purpose and deterministic evolution. Autevolution,
as defined here, thus attempts to deal with these important paradoxes
in and among current theories. These paradoxes are further described
in the discussion section
Criterion 4: Consistency
An acceptable new worldview must be consistent not only with
itself, but with previous knowledge (i.e. previous observations
and the principles they confirmed). This idea is similar to Bohr’s
principle of “correspondence”
between quantum theory and classical physics, except that consistency
is less demanding than Bohr’s concept, which may not always be
achievable as he eventually realized.
The idea of consistency is implied in identifying and resolving
paradox. The argument goes like this: To demonstrate that a paradox
exists in the first place, we rely on previous observations. In
doing so, we implicitly accept previous forms of evidence and
methods of confirmation; otherwise the apparent paradox, and thus
the justification for seeking a new theory, has itself been invalidated.
Therefore, a new, more explanatory worldview cannot reject
results of the old, even though it may provide radically new ways
of explaining them. For example, relativity does not reject
results obtained by scientists working within the thought paradigms
defined by Newtonian mechanics and Cartesian geometry, at the
level of precision that was obtainable from them (in this case,
they were shown to be derivable from relativity theory). A view
that rejects previous experience in its opening assumptions would
suffer from being out of context, and would be less likely to
be useful scientifically.
Like the quantum theory, autevolution based on observer-participancy
would not be able to dispense with the “classical” objective
view (i.e. an observer separated from nature). This is because,
as Bohr put it:
“we must not forget that, in spite of their limitation,
we can by no means dispense with those forms of perception which
colour our whole language and in terms of which all experience
must ultimately be expressed.”
As individual organisms with sense perception, the objective
view will always be important to us as our means of conceptualizing
the world. Thus, while nonmaterialist formalism may be included
within theory, it is necessary to maintain consistency (and correspondence
when possible) with the classical, objective, and materialistic
view of nature.
Application to autevolution:
There seems to be nothing inherent in the assumption that living
structures have magnified observer-participancy that would a
priori contradict current knowledge of nature. It would, however,
extend the range of explainable phenomena beyond the domain of
pure materialism, which would then be treated as a limited case
of a more general theory. This would satisfy consistency, just
as the theory of relativity is consistent with Newtonian mechanics.
Criterion 5: Formalization of theory and testable hypotheses
An acceptable worldview must allow theory to be formalized in
a way that allows testable hypotheses about its causal processes.
In practice, a revolutionary theory will not be taken seriously
unless it can include acceptable causalities in its formalization.
This requirement rules out, for example, cosmically theistic worldviews
(as a basis for scientific theory) that attribute all cause to
one or more external gods, who/which transcend our ability to
investigate. Within such views, experiments to determine cause,
and thus to develop causal or predictive theory, are meaningless,
and theory itself is unnecessary (note that this criterion does
not reject such views, but only claims that they cannot be used
as a basis for scientific theory). It is essential to the scientific
method (as modeled earlier) to be able to create an objective
viewpoint for testing hypotheses, in order to produce unambiguous
results.
Application to autevolution:
Autevolution as described here is no exception and is not subjectively
defined. It is holistic in the sense that it is a participatory
theory, but the effects of participation are theoretically limited
by mechanical constraints. It allows theory to consider the effect
of a fundamentally subjective process (observer-participancy),
but retains the use of objectivity as the means for confirming
results. As with the quantum theory, it is still possible to study
objectively the results of a fundamentally subjective and non-deterministic
process that has quantifiable limits. The next challenge to autevolution
theories is to construct and test such a formalism.
Criterion 6: Fruitfulness
Having met all other criteria, the final test of a worldview is
its ability to spawn meaningful theories that eventually produce
useful results. This criterion of fruitfulness is crucial, however
it cannot be applied in evaluating a worldview in advance of its
formalization and use to construct and test theories. As described
elsewhere, fruitfulness can often be determined only after painstaking
attempts at theory development.
Application to autevolution:
An attempt to outline some possible steps for theory development
(formalization) and testing has been made in this paper. A proposed
computer simulation may serve as an initial step in this process
(see Foreword). The many analogies suggested with observed phenomena
and psychological experience indicate that, if a successful formalism
can be developed, for example through simulation, that the results
will be broadly applicable to many fields, and many predictions
could clearly be made and tested. Beyond that, however, true fruitfulness
will require the test of time.
Revised and reprinted from: Kineman, John Jay. 1991. “Gaia:
hypothesis or worldview?” Paper delivered at the American
Geophysical Union annual Chapman Conference, panel on epistemology,
March, 1988, San Diego, California. Chapter 7 In: Schneider, S.
H., and P. J. Boston (eds). 1991. Scientists on Gaia. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. 433p.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. “Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution.” Boulder: Bear Mountain
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Please address comments to: John Jay Kineman