Kineman, J. 1997. Theory of Autevolution
The Gaia worldview
and the need for theoretical foundations
- The Gaia metaphor
- Worldviews
- Need for an evolutionary worldview
- Need for an interdisciplinary worldview
- Worldviews
- Physics envy
Theory development
Platonic realism - Need for new theory
The Gaia metaphor
It was suggested during the Chapman conference that the Gaia hypothesis
can only be taken seriously as a metaphor. For example, one version
of the Gaia Hypotheses (Lovelock, 1979)
states metaphorically that: “The entire range of living matter
on Earth, from whales to viruses, from oaks to algae, could be
regarded as constituting a single living entity, capable of manipulating
the Earth’s atmosphere to suit its overall needs and endowed with
faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent parts.”
The problem with a metaphor is that, at most, it describes phenomena:
It thus cannot be used to construct theory, but does often inspire
its construction. Lovelock’s statement is not a scientific hypothesis,
but rather a metaphorical description of phenomena, and it is
not prescriptive in that form. On the other hand, it should be
no more bothersome than Darwin’s references to “struggle
for survival;” which he himself called metaphor, but then
continued to employ in describing his theory (Todes, 1989;
and Richards, 1987). The ability
of each of these metaphors to produce popular misconceptions has
been similar, and perhaps their ability to stimulate genuine scientific
thought may not be so different either.
Worldviews
First, we must recognize that all theories are based on founding
assumptions, often metaphysical, that are not themselves subject
to experimental confirmation. Such foundations often involve circular
(i.e. tautological) definitions and arbitrary views of nature
that provide the starting point and structure for theory. For
example, the Euclidean geometry assumed by Newton was consistent
with all tests at the time and was therefore accepted as an accurate
model. The fact that it was eventually found to be inaccurate
on relativistic scales does not damage Newtonian theory itself,
but rather establishes the limits of its worldview. Such definitions
and underlying assumptions represent the way we choose to perceive
reality, i.e. from what perspective (paradigm or worldview)
we will develop theories, all of which are limited and many of
which have taken dramatic turns historically. The value of theory
thus cannot be judged on the testability of its foundations (assumptions
and definitions), but rather on its performance as a structure
for productive scientific thought (fruitfulness). It is, in contrast,
individual processes or mechanisms
proposed within theory that can be tested empirically. This distinction
between assumptions and causal processes of theory is critical
to evaluating new concepts such as implied by strong forms of
Gaia.
Need for an evolutionary worldview
Second, a non-metaphorical theory underlying strong forms of
Gaia must involve explanations in terms of both ecological and
evolutionary processes. Evolution is as fundamental to the
way we see the universe as are space and time. As Peter Medawar
was quoted as saying regarding creationism, “for a
biologist, the alternative to thinking in evolutionary terms is
not to think at all” (Little, 1980).
In other words, if we hypothesize novel emergent properties of
living systems, we must be able to explain how they might have
come about, perhaps using new theory, but without contradicting
known processes. This is true for Lovelock’s obviously metaphorical
and phenomenalistic description of a self-organizing Gaia, just
as it was for the Darwinian (metaphorical and phenomenalistic)
struggle for survival. Current models of evolution incorporate
many confirmed causal processes (such as genetic variation and
expression, heritability, differential survival), but are also
composed of definitions (such as for life and fitness) and starting
assumptions (such as genetic novelty and the role of environmental
selection). It is the limitations of these definitions and assumptions
that new theory must rigorously explore, and if current theory
cannot explain observable Gaian phenomena, it may be as reasonable
to examine our theoretical assumptions about life and evolution
as it is to challenge such enigmatic observations.
Interdisciplinary worldview
Physics envy
Theory development
Platonic realism
It is apparent that any strong basis for Gaia theory emerging
from such efforts must be truly interdisciplinary, and thus
will require a commonly accepted epistemology. It is likely that
a unified view of living systems will require both new scientific
perspectives and epistemological synthesis to fully accommodate
interdisciplinary issues (Roederer, 1985;
Goldberg, 1989). Yet
there has been little work on interdisciplinary synthesis, and
even our models of science tend to be divided along disciplinary
lines, perhaps most sharply between the physical and biological
sciences, but also within biological disciplines. This engages
two philosophical debates that have been active during the past
quarter century; one concerning the applicability of scientific
methods across disciplines (particularly the applicability of
the methods of physics to the fields of evolution and ecology),
and the other concerning the relative merits of instrumentalism
versus realism (see section on epistemology).
A brief history illustrates the problem.
Physics envy
Physics envy was especially common among biologists in the early
60’s. This was epitomized by an article calling for the use of
“strong inference” (Platt, 1964),
which emphasized the tradition of testing and exclusion of “multiple
alternative hypotheses” (after the traditions of Bacon, Popper,
Chamberlin, etc.), citing this as “a surer method to produce
more rapid results.” A greater emphasis on this Hypothetico-Deductive
(H-D) methodology, or strong inference (the same process emphasized
by Kirchner, 1991), did
indeed take place but with less robust theoretical results than
in physics. This prompted Paine (1977),
for example, to translate Platt’s appeal for hard science into
an appeal for greater emphasis on experimental approaches in building
theory, and less reliance on theoretical dogma — particularly
the “dogmatic predictions of steady-state competition theory.”
While the experimental ecologists have apparently fared well with
the method, disenchantment seems to surround the development of
theory. Simberloff (1981)
perhaps symbolized this exasperation by suggesting (somewhat facetiously)
that only the results of field or lab experiments should be recognized
as “valid contributions” to the scientific literature.
In contrast to blaming the ecologists, Hall (1985),
for example, asserted that Platt’s strong inference may be inapplicable
to ecology due to the many “system-dependent results”
and the “multi-factorial world of ecology.” Another
claim defensively asserts that physics is in trouble, having advanced
rapidly to the point where, as Niels Bohr (1961)
declared in 1929, it is impossible to uphold the concept of a
purely objective reality. Others (e.g., Thompson, 1989)
have used this development in physics to justify the pursuit of
instrumentalist methods in evolution theory and theoretical ecology.
Theory development
Regardless of where we attempt to point the finger, the concern
in developing theoretical ecology and linking it with evolution
theory seems to have been over an apparent lack of vitality in
theory development and the lack of correspondence between these
and other disciplines. This created a situation described
by Ehrlich (1988), in
which ecological theory cannot be based on physical or even universal
laws, because each ecological system seems unique. This condition
should raise serious concern. For one thing, it is hard to accept
that physics has not had to deal with similar epistemological
problems, yet its tradition o seeking consistent and universal
theory has resulted in great advances. Perhaps more to the point,
and where Hall (1985) is
probably right, is that we do not understand all of the epistemological
processes that have, in some areas of physics, succeeded in integrating
theory and eliminating theoretical system dependencies.
Instrumental theories (which are accorded meaning by virtue of
their behavior in relation to nature, as opposed to being based
on supposedly “real” quantities or principles, such
as mass, force, etc.) by their design tend to develop as distinct
paradigms. This can result in diverse theories and models that
are “incommensurable” (i.e., they cannot be merged).
However, it is important to remember that instrumentalism emerged
in physics not because of the failure of attempts to describe
nature in real terms, but because of the limits of perception
itself. In fact it was a form of Platonic realism (strictly speaking,
the notion of a primary unitary reality that scientific theory
attempts to describe and predict, but which may never be fully
known) that allowed physics to discover the limits of classical
reality. Faced with the situation that beyond this point concepts
of “real” in the classical sense necessarily became
blurred, it then became a philosophical question whether or not
the constructs of theory in the quantum world could be called
“real” at all. In regard to ecological and evolutionary
theories, however, we have yet to consider seriously nonclassical
views, having not defined the limits to the concept of a single
classical reality in mainstream biological science.
Platonic realism
Thus, it is not surprising that an emphasis on H-D methodology
(or strong inference) in ecology has worked well for experimentalists
and not so well for theoreticians. The vitality of theory development
that has characterized physics is not primarily attributable to
H-D methods, but to rigorously questioning the basis of theory
through attempts to understand the nature of reality (i.e.,
what I refer to simply as realism), a process that can challenge
one’s basic perspective and lead necessary transitions to new
assumptions. Ecology, on the other hand, seems to be abandoning
the concept of an underlying reality, which prevents it from making
important transitions. Correspondingly, there is little effort
in ecology and evolution to integrate theories or combine their
assumptions (as was characteristic in the realism of physicists),
even for classical mechanistic models. Meanwhile, the instrumentalist
view that ecology seems to be welcoming quickly, has not been
fully accepted even in quantum physics, which may instead be leaning
toward a “scientific quantum realism” that maintains
the pursuit of a parsimonious reality (Rohrlich and Hardin, 1983;
Rohrlich, 1989). A
truly interdisciplinary science cannot develop if we pursue epistemologies
that cannot be integrated among theories and disciplines.
Need for new theory
Perhaps, then, the problem of vagueness attributed to Gaia, and
other theories involving life as a causal agent results from trying
to force them into current biological theory, which lends little
mechanistic support, has numerous controversies of its own, and
has adopted an epistemology that avoids challenging basic assumptions
or exploring new ones. In the next section, I attempt to define
a strong basis for Gaia theory in terms of autevolution
and identify worldview assumptions that must be considered.
Revised and reprinted from: Kineman, John Jay. 1991. “Gaia:
hypothesis or worldview?” Paper delivered at the American
Geophysical Union annual Chapman Conference, panel on epistemology,
March, 1988, San Diego, California. Chapter 7 In: Schneider, S.
H., and P. J. Boston (eds). 1991. Scientists on Gaia. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. 433p.
Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. “Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution.” Boulder: Bear Mountain
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