Theory of Autevolution: Footnotes

Gaia: Hypothesis or Worldview?

FOOTNOTES

Autevolution
Complimentarity
Consciousness
Correspondence
Mechanism or Process
Paradigm or Worldview
Philosophy of science
Positivism
Quantum implications for life
Quantum Postulate
Reality

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Autevolution

I could find no previous use of the term “autevolution”
in the literature or in common English (although the search was
certainly incomplete) and hence am attempting to define it here.
“Aut” means “self,” as in autecology
which deals with interactions between an organism and its environment.
Thus autevolution would mean, literally, “self evolution.”
Because this is defined as a holistic phenomena it has two aspects:
evolution of the experiential or perceptual “self,”
and the role of this “self” in affecting the course
of evolution. As with other theories, there are two levels: (a)
the level of the worldview, which can be evaluated for its reasonableness
and usefulness but cannot be assailed on logical grounds; and
(2) consequent theory, which must propose causal processes by
which it is supposed to operate. Autevolution is discussed on
both levels in this paper. (use browser back
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Complimentarity

Complementary views are views (or theories) which are each
necessary for a complete description of a system or phenomena,
but that cannot be combined (for example inspecting the weave
of a Persian rug versus evaluating the artistry of its pattern
Rohrlich, 1989). Such
inability to obtain all the information simultaneously is epistemic
uncertainty. In the case of complementarity in quantum
physics, not only is it impossible to integrate the different
views (e.g. elementary particle states), but choosing one view
actually allows the state of the other to change, because of the
uncertainty principle. This is ontic uncertainty, a property of
nature (as best we know). (use browser back
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Consciousness

Note, however, that both Bohr and Wheeler avoid using the term
consciousness because of its human connotations, preferring
the term registration for the most rudimentary observation
event. Bohr also referred to the psyche in this context, which
he argued must, in its most basic nature, be a part of all living
forms, and have its basis in inanimate nature. He thus saw living
systems as magnifying this registration ability, which is already
evident in inanimate matter, although in seemingly random events.
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Correspondence

Consistency means lack of conflict given the scope of the
concepts being compared, not necessarily that one theory is derivable
from another, as in strict correspondence, even though derivability
is the most powerful demonstration of consistency. The fact that
Newtonian dynamics and Cartesian geometry represent a special,
derivable case of the theory of relativity was a very satisfying
result. Nevertheless, mathematical consistency or correspondence
may be difficult or impossible to demonstrate, as Niels Bohr discovered
in his attempt to express quantum theory in classical terms. It
is not the mathematics that must be treated consistently between
theories (or world views), but rather the predictions of theory
or specific phenomena that have been experimentally verified.
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Mechanism or Process

Many branches of science use the term mechanism to refer
to the inner workings or processes proposed by theory, disregarding
the term’s restrictive mechanical, materialistic, or deterministic
connotations (a distinction that is unnecessary in fields that
study only classical phenomena). To avoid confusion, the term
process or causal process
is used here except when classical mechanism is the intended
meaning. (use browser back arrow to return
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Paradigm or Worldview

Usage of the term paradigm tends to vary, but here refers
to the set of operating assumptions for a given thought exercise
at any level. The term world view refers to the grand paradigm
for a scientific theory or discipline. At still another level,
one can speak of the paradigm of science, which has to do with
science methodology, or epistemology (the subject of this paper).
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Philosophy of science

It is neither feasible nor appropriate here to attempt a review
of the literature on the philosophy of science. Donovan, et al. (1988)
have provided a current review of the field, and Rohrlich (1989)
provided a simplified account of the central idea presented here
(paradox). Most of what is presented recognizes the philosophies
of Popper (1959 and 1965)
and Kuhn (1970). Except for
retaining a place for traditional H-D methodology, the model presented
should be compatible with Suppe’s (1977)
account of “historical realism,” which provides a balance
of philosophical views. The model presented attempts to integrate
these philosophies to represent some major characteristics, but
of course cannot capture the full intricacy of scientific progress.
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Positivism

Many philosophers today claim that rigorously positivistic models
do not reflect what really takes place in most disciplines. Elements
of positivism are retained here as an idealized process, operating
within definable limits (i.e., the worldview). Even as a theoretical
process, its manifestation in practice may be obscured by other
factors, such as the linkage with observational analysis that
is depicted in the diagram. (use browser back
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Quantum implications for life

Analogies between physics and the mind have had a profound effect
on modern thinking, which indirectly shapes our scientific, technological,
and cultural paradigms. The reader may note Capra (1975)
and a whole genre of other popular books. (use
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Quantum postulate

In Bohr’s words the quantum postulate states that “the
finite magnitude of the quantum of action prevents altogether
a sharp distinction being made between a phenomenon and the agency
by which it is observed”
(Bohr, 1958).
Or, as Wheeler puts it: “No elementary phenomenon is a
phenomenon until it is a registered (i.e. observed) phenomenon….We
are all inescapably involved in bringing about that which appears
to be happening”
(Wheeler, 1981).(use
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Reality

The question of what is “real” has no unequivocal answer.
The trend (Suppe, 1977)
has been to define “real” as our present concept of
reality, our belief in that concept, having evidence for it, our
belief in our evidence, etc. (sometimes called the “K-K thesis”).
Implicit in this philosophy is that there is, in fact, something
to know, i.e. an ultimate reality that theory approximates. The
term realism as used here is thus somewhat relative to current
beliefs, although the important point is that it seeks to base
theory on real constructs. (use browser back
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Reprinted from: Kineman, John Jay. 1991. “Gaia: Hypothesis
or worldview?” Chapter 7 In: Schneider, S. H., and P. J.
Boston (eds). 1991. Scientists on Gaia. Papers delivered
at the American Geophysical Union’s annual Chapman Conference
in March, 1988. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 433p.

Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. “Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution.” Boulder: Bear Mountain
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