Relational Science

So, are we discussing the definitions of these words “cause” and “influence” or different kinds of causes in which information causes (encoding and decoding) might be better understood publicly as “influence” because of their less singular effect (i.e., uncertain or complex relation as opposed to law-like efficient cause)?

Are we in agreement at all that there are different archetypal kinds of causes, or is cause only one type? If different kinds, how should they be distinguished?

John

Jack,

Although we have different meta views in detail, I basically agree with what Len says here. The distinction is not going to be that clean unless you go to some very fundamental principle that doesn’t always show up in a practical engineering case. E.g., we know material in general is vacuum energy and quantum uncertainties, but we don’t need to worry about that at the scale of building construction.

I also agree that we should consider information relations as causes, but of course that runs into trouble culturally because the word “cause” has been so strongly associated with efficient cause. There is also a difference in how immediate and predictable, i.e., singular the “cause” is. When a macroscopic object moves under a gravitational force we can safely attribute efficient cause to gravity and its law is pretty darn exact at that scale. If we consider General Relativity at the cosmological scale there is the shape of space-time, which is more informational and has a feedback to dynamics. Configuration of masses warps space-time, which changes the coordinate system for describing the configuration of masses. This is not really a dynamical entailment because space-time is contextual, being the general reality in which the masses behave (and some models even say the existence of mass depends on this relation in a complex non-computable way).

Where Len and I might (I’m not sure) have different ideas is in distinguishing the types of causality, if that is useful or valid, how the causes might entail each other, and/or if they should instead be limited to one dynamical category for epistemological reasons.

Cheers,
John

PS I hope this is all helping the discussion in some way that is being tracked ..It should not be just a chat as we all are spending a lot of time going back and forth. I know it helps me sort out my own ideas, which do change as we proceed. To preserve that, I’m copying my responses to the Relational Science Blog site as a documented stream – I hope that is OK (I’m deleting the history, however, so its just my comments I’m posting).

Hi Jack,

Yes – thanks for the examples. Indeed they are typically treated as Q2, a dynamical process that influences another dynamical process; but the reason for modeling it as Q3 is just what you said, the case where it is not a direct dynamical causation between the two processes, but instead is informational in nature. It turns on/off or, let’s say ‘constrains’ or ‘enables’ the process (what I meant by ‘regulates’) with some uncertainty. I hear what you are saying about the word “regulate” – a problem because we are used to thinking of everything as a dynamical interaction, and many regulatory mechanisms are familiar to us, like the governor on a lawn mower. In that case it is clear that both are mechanical systems by design, set up to influence each other mechanically. It is a Q2 interaction, not quite the same as a catalyst because it is good enough to model them as a mutual dynamic, i.e., efficient closure. The state of the governor influences the rate of fuel injection which influences the speed of the engine which influences the state of the governor via negative feedback, thus controlling the speed of the engine. A typical dynamic feedback mechanism. I’ll come back to this.

So, it seems that is precisely what you were getting at in saying the catalytic component is independent of the thing it catalyzes – its not a control mechanism that depends on the rate it controls. I’m thinking about that – what relational logic there is that would distinguish what seems to be a one-way effect. However, in the example of the catalytic converter, if high temperature is required there is, in practice, a feedback because the higher catalyzed burning rate raises the temperature and thus both the effectiveness of the catalyst, and perhaps some affect on the catalyst. I am not familiar with what determines the life of the catalytic converter active ingredient – does it degrade, perhaps from the high temperature? I assume it is not consumed at all in the reaction of the burning gasses, but does high temperature resulting from the reaction cause it to decompose and be lost to the environment???? In other words, I think a big difference between a catalytic, formal cause interaction and one that could be put into Q2 as a commensurate dynamical process is how direct the feedback is. I’m working this thought out as I type, so bear with me…..

If I use the holon diagram and think of a pure catalyst, that would be a sub-system occupying Q3, like below, where you can see the two systems A (the catalyzed process) and B (the catalyst) interact informationally through each of their Q3’s. In this case, B provides at least part of the formal cause for A (there can be other similar relations) to enable it to occur. But to do so it must then allow itself to be influenced by system A, also through Q3 formal decoding. This would be the case of “closure to formal cause”. So, if the relational theory holds up, we should be able to find something about the gas reaction in the catalytic converter that creates an environmental influence on the catalyst itself. I don’t know the chemistry involved in that, but my suspicion is that there’s some effect of temperature on the catalyst, shortening its life. It doesn’t have to be the only or even the main effect on the catalyst – which also can have other formal cause influences. Perhaps engineering a good catalyst is a matter of finding something for which this feedback is small compared to the formal cause that defines and maintains the substance normally. Thus is appears to remain stable and last a long time, but not indefinitely?? Does that work?

To the extent that we find a really good material that doesn’t degrade fast, and we can ignore its rate of decomposition as a result of use, then indeed we could model it as a direct causal interaction in Q2. In that case it would appear to be an efficient closure; but the cost of doing that is less precision, and that precision becomes important in non-engineered systems where MTBF could not be extended. In the case of living systems, what seems typical is for this kind of closure to be quite influential in both directions at the organism level (while there are certainly many catalytic reactions that appear to be one-way at the molecular level and are typically modeled as reducible dynamics).

Speculating on the dangers of modeling something as Q3 vs. Q2, I would say there is little danger. There is a set of dynamical equations implied in the catalytic sub-system (B), and a set of dynamical equations implied in the main system (A). The only issue is if these two sets of dynamical equations can be written as one dynamical equation. If we ignore the feedback to the catalyst, and uncertainty as to whether the reaction will actually take place under given conditions, then they can be, and typically are. But if we begin by writing them separately and relating them informationally, we preserve in the analysis the possibility of examining the uncertainty and feedback that might be present — if we are interested in looking at that.

PastedGraphic-3.pdf

Getting back to the lawn mower, it occurs to me that the uncertainty we find in formal cause interactions is minimized in this case, but instead appears as a time lag – so you can get an oscillation going. That is still in the common time of both system models, so it is still describable by dynamical equations – not yet an impredicative loop. But it is becoming much more sensitive to the environment, to other formal causes, because there are lots of things that can influence the response of each system. Indeed we take advantage of that by introducing a damping effect from some other mechanism. Still we can represent the damping as a mechanical Q2 effect. So, we’ve added three mechanisms in this case, but for the purposes of describing the lawn mower, they are all reducible in Q2. What may not be reducible, either as a practical or theoretical matter, is the effect of the climate – humidity, temperature, aerosols, etc. If only for practical reasons these would require coupling via Q3 with separately written models.

On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:41 PM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

Seems to me these examples point to quadrant 2 rather than 3. Jack
On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:40 PM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

John, Thanks for this. I suggest caution regarding any claim of regulation. To the degree that regulation involves force, particularly directed force I think catalyst only influences, not causes or constrains.
The catalytic converter in a motor vehicle includes a passive catalyst that influences chemical reactions unless it becomes covered with other materials. Interestingly, the influence does not occur until the material is heated to a minimum temperature.
A catalytic cracker is one kind of oil refining technology, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/catalytic-cracking.html
In the 1980s the Cat Cracker at Bay St. Louis, MS, was controlled by a Honeywell TDC3000 consisting of 2500 variables and 2500 equations serving 173 control loops (temperature, pressure, flow, etc.) which could vary the relative % of gasoline, diesel, kerosene, oil, grease, etc. per barrel of crude.

On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:15 PM, John Jay Kineman <john.kineman> wrote:

Jack,

I added back the distribution so the idea isn’t lost.

Your question:

Good. Now, how does catalyst relate to the four relationals?

I’d say it corresponds, in the most general sense, with formal cause, the upper-left quad in this diag. Its effect is to regulate the dynamics. The contextual constraint on dynamics is a function (and functor, mathematically).

This is the diagram we settled on in Linz at the IFSR Team 6 conversation. We’re drawing a parallel with Participatory Action Research, so using those lables (Plan, Act, Observe, Reflect). But once again, the four quads are archetype causalities/explanations of a system establishing each other cyclically; so the labels can change depending on the system being described. We can add “regulator” or “catalyst” to Q3. Also each quad can be replaced with a self-similar diagram, so its a holarchical view of ‘whole’ relations. The catalyst itself can be a whole system with its own material system. As we discussed, the degree of independence between catalyst (the extent that it is altered by feedbacks) can scale, but in this view, every interaction implies a loop at some level.

<PastedGraphic-1.pdf>

On Dec 18, 2014, at 11:37 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

Good. Now, how does catalyst relate to the four relationals?
On Dec 17, 2014, at 3:36 PM, John Jay Kineman <john.kineman> wrote:

Yes Jack, that’s what I’m saying. Every system has a catalyst.

JK

On Dec 17, 2014, at 11:09 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

John,Suggest you consider The Skillful Facilitator, Roger Schwarz, Jossey-Bass; 2 edition (June 15, 2002)Also, any so-called template for a process that does not provide for learning/evolution of the template, c.f., ISO 15288
In fact, it is hard to find a system that does not contain a catalyst. How do you see the role of temperature in a cornfield?

On Dec 17, 2014, at 10:56 AM, John Jay Kineman <John.Kineman> wrote:

I would look to find a social or business example where someone or group introduces a change in a system or institution, without also participating in that change and in some way also being changed.

What makes it go? Using your notion of X, the tickles come from the context (environment) of X (which may include the supplier of resources to X). If the tickle is accepted by a component in X then System Happens and a response occurs. The response may change the content and structure and gradients in X as well as cause an Effect on context.
The harder question is What makes it appear in the first place. First, though, we must be clear about what happens if X encompasses everything, one system, as distinct from X vs. Context of X. What say ye?

On Dec 17, 2014, at 9:15 AM, John Jay Kineman <john.kineman> wrote:

Jack,

I think the problem with that is “what does the tickling”. What makes it go. The relational framework is self-motivating; each causal aspect drives the next in a cycle, so it answers the question ‘why’ something happens. In this model, there would be no static configurations.

Regarding the law-like process, that simply says that for everything you can ask questions about, one of the questions you can ask (and find answers to) is “how does it behave”.

I am less certain of the ‘law-like’ part — what I mean is we can find laws, but I’m not saying they would form a completely formalizable set.

Cheers,
John

On Dec 16, 2014, at 5:25 PM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

John,Whew! I will respond to the first two paragraphs now and will have to consider the rest later.
Perhaps this first response will make further interchange unnecessary.
I do not disagree with relational framework as you represent it. However, a difference in our views is rooted in “It would also have a law-like process associated with its temporal behavior.” I make a distinction between having a process and executing a process. In my mental model this is similar to potential energy vs. kinetic energy.
In my view a system exists when and while a configuration is responding to a stimulus then reverts to a configuration (which may be, usually is, different from before).
I do not claim that this is a popular perspective, only that I have found it quite useful in sorting out many misunderstandings among practitioners. A configuration can reflect all 4 or 5 aspects. It just doesn’t laugh until tickled.
OBTW, like us it can’t tickle itself.
Make sense?

On Dec 16, 2014, at 5:01 PM, John Jay Kineman <John.Kineman> wrote:

Jack,

I’d be interested in this distinction between a system and a configuration of end items.
In the relational framework, there are four archetypal ways of pointing to something systemic; four kinds or aspects to reality. These are never separate, except that we can see their separate aspects. But one of them could not exist without the other three – it is a natural unit that when seen or interacted interacts or gets seen in one of these four ways depending on how we approach it. So, if I ask about something we’ll label as X, X would have a measurable, material aspect to it. It would also have a law-like process associated with its temporal behavior. It would also have a certain design, parameters, or shape to its associated laws, and it would have some precedent structure that acquired a role in a larger system that, in a sense, gave it meaning and specification as X4 (the whole of X). Additionally, it would have a 5th aspect which is some transcendent quality associated with the whole – identity or ‘self’ primitive as those might be.

That’s the holon philosophy. If we decide to think that way, even for experimental purposes, then a “configuration of end items” would be its material aspect, whereas a “system” would imply all 4 or 5 aspects. But, in theory, there can’t be one without all, although we may have to look pretty far throughout nature to find them all (the theory does not say they need to be co-located or bound together by a skin as organisms are, just that they theoretically exist in nature, otherwise none of the aspects could exist).

So, perhaps by explaining it this way I can get across the idea that there is a way of looking at and for ‘whole’ systems, and yet we will commonly see fractions of systems. Also, the supposedly ‘whole’ entailments are not absolute or unique. If there were only one set of 4 aspects for a given occurrence, it would be completely isolated from everything else. We could not know of it. The 4 aspects are causalities, i.e., ways of knowing or interacting in nature. So, to be interactive (or known) it must have entailments with other such whole systems. It then meets Arthur Koestler’s concept of holon, which is both part and whole at the same time. It has a holistic property – the identity holon that labels it as a unique system – and also interactive properties that link it to other systems to form larger and smaller systems.

In practice, the idea is not so strange as it might sound. We identify a natural object by its measurable properties and by what we can infer about its laws of origin and behavior. That’s at least half of the holon, and sometimes 3/4ths if we get into system-dependent laws. The critical missing element is the 4th quadrant – final cause – which has had so much misunderstanding since 1000BC that most scientists have discarded it and won’t think about it. But even in its rather anthropomorphic label as “purpose” we know we can’t really get rid of it, certainly not in soft systems. Hard systems are essentially defined by getting rid of it. In doing that, what we are really doing is separating the origin of a system from its operation and working only with its operation (also associated with the idea of ‘configuration’). We are no longer working with its deeper “organization” (as Rosen emphasized), which would involve its origin and system identity. In fact, for all mechanistic systems we pushed that origin and organization back to the big bang to get rid of it in ‘practical’ science. Since then, so the story goes, it has only been a matter of ‘reconfiguration’ and thus we can look for a single set of natural laws that describe reconfiguration of already created objects or energies. Not surprisingly, as we calculate such reconfiguration, which uses energy, we calculate that such a system must run down and eventually be exhausted. Obviously that is the case if we have eliminated all possibility of new origins.

Then we have quite a bit of difficulty when it comes to living and cognitive systems because it is hard to talk about them without referring to some kind of origin. Origin of species, new ideas, etc. These are origin problems and traditional science eliminated origin problems, so there is tremendous controversy about vitalism and the like being un-scientific, or at least there has been. But what could be more obvious than the fact that we can’t talk about origins in science if we define science only as reconfiguration after everything has originated? So that is the root of our confusion.

Formal and final cause put origin back into science, but how to do it without making it all arbitrary? To put it back together we have to un-do a huge mistake that was made in 1000BC. That mistake led to a tremendous era of material discovery and understanding, but it blinded us to origins. It was to imagine causality as a hierarchy from an infinite unknowable creator down to precisely knowable matter and energy. In earlier times, the scientific world view was not hierarchical like that, it was cyclical. The creator was nature itself. Final cause stems from material existence. It is the meaning of a material existence with regard to some larger system (context). That is also the ancient idea of karma. The past shapes the purpose and direction of the future. It may seem like an anthropomorphic view because we are most familiar with that kind of think in human affairs. However, what if humans evolved from nature and now reflect its already established fundamental properties? Then it may not be so wrong to associate at least very deep principles we can learn from humanity, with properties of nature. Where else did they come from?

On that level, as I’ve described it so far, the relational view might be taken as the ultimate atheism. Whereas the Western view pushed God out of nature and before the big bang, this idea seems to eliminate the concept altogether and replace it with nested whole natural systems. But it is actually not atheism, because the infinity still exists; it is just brought into the natural system instead of being pushed out of it. It is actually more compatible with modern contemplative religious thought. But like the hierarchical idea it is still possible to do science short of running into the infinities. In old science we could look at mechanisms without running into infinities. We could not look at consciousness or life without encountering them. In the relational view we can look at life and consciousness without running into the infinite regress of larger and smaller systems. They are still there, implicitly, but the method of whole analysis allows us to construct proximal relations and leave the infinities as more remote effects. So it expands science.

Sorry for such an involved explanation of the holon view in answer to a simple question, but it seems unproductive to keep saying what relational theory says about various things without saying why it says it and giving the view that is required for understanding it. If relational theory is viewed from a traditional mechanistic world view, it can only appear to be mystical and untestable, because it refers to causes that are outside the mechanistic world view — those are the contextual causes (final-formal entailments that comprise the contextual aspect) and (functor encoding/decoding) relations between context and realization. The relations between context and realization are strictly informational in nature – they are not causal relations at all. The relation between a blueprint and the actions involved in construction is not causal, it is informational and acts as a constraint on those dynamics. The same is true, I would think, of a catalyst. It provides the general conditions in which a completely separate process can occur. It does not cause the process to occur, but enables and allows it to occur. The process may not occur with the catalyst (if the process isn’t right), and the process could occur without the catalyst, which only makes the process more likely. That’s typical of an information relation. Its like knowing there is a sale on at the grocery store does not cause you to go there and buy the sale items, but it can act as a catalyst to increase the likelihood that you will.

Now, I’m no chemist, but I can imagine there are many reactions that are pretty darn certain given the catalyst – they don’t seem to have the uncertainty I indicated above. That does not violate the theory. Information relations can become reduced by a lot of environmental constraints and can begin to act mechanically. A complex system can mimic a mechanism. In that case, the tendency is to write the equations for the catalyst together with the equations for the process being catalyzed, treating them both as part of the same set of natural laws. Its an approximation, but we still call it a catalyst because it is a clearly defined different ingredient that doesn’t directly produce the result but allows it to happen. But when we translate the concept into the living and cognitive domain, we clearly introduce contextual differenes. Even in standard definitions of catalyst list one for chemistry and another for society “a person or thing that precipitates an event”. Obviously, a good comedian can precipitate a lot of fun and laughter, but not necessarily. He/she doesn’t cause the fun and laughter, it is caused within each participant if they are in the mood for that kind of environment. Obviously with chemistry and lower organisms some ‘moods’ are pretty darn reliable, so it seems to be a mechanical connection in those cases.

So, if that helps somewhat and doesn’t serve to just make the relational idea seem even more remote, then perhaps the answer to this question about catalyst being a system or material can be easily answered with the word “yes”. As a catalytic system it would certainly have a material aspect. But it is not the material aspect that is directly associated with the catalytic effect; it is the context of that material aspect that is influencing the process. Example: lets take snow. Snow does not cause skiing. But the contextual aspect of a snowy, hilly environment enables it, induces it, if people want to ski. Its even a necessary environment. But a mechanical analysis would simply write an equation for the amount of snow that correlates with the amount of skiing, as if one caused the other. Then, to be honest, we would have to add an uncertainty factor.

Yours,
John

Dr. John J. Kineman
Senior Research Scientist
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado
john.kineman
(Ph) 303-443-7544: (M) 303-586-4969

On Dec 16, 2014, at 7:22 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

Ken, Can you please describe an example? It may elucidate catalyst or question the whether it is in fact a system as contrasted to a configuration of end items.
Jack
On Dec 15, 2014, at 7:52 PM, Ken Lloyd <kalloyd> wrote:

Jack,

We have some examples where the morphism between the system and its context(s) morphs, leaving both the system and contexts unchanged. This in some sense affects the behavior and evolution of the system. Perhaps this is what the conversation means by the term “catalyst”. But, my interpretation is far from certain.

Ken

From: Jack Ring [mailto:jring7]
Sent: Monday, December 15, 2014 5:47 PM
To: John Jay Kineman
Cc: Steve Wallis, PhD; Len Troncale; Gary Langford; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; William Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf; David Rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby; Ken Lloyd
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

When a system acts on its context then the context morphs. Further, the action can result in the system morphing too. However, a catalyst is not affected by its participation in any interaction, never morphs. Rather like a field than an object. Perhaps a catalyst influences existence but not regulates it per se.
Am I misinterpreting your response?

On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:27 PM, John Jay Kineman <John.Kineman> wrote:

Hi Jack,

You asked how R-theory would treat the notion of a catalyst. Here’s what occurs to me.

The short answer is that a catalyst is formal cause. It is one system providing a context for the existence or regulation of another system. It thus corresponds with quadrant 3 in the holon diagram, the expression (decoding) of a model. Every natural system has formal cause and thus the equivalent of a catalyst – it is the aspect of contextual system that allows the material system to exist, or limits or regulates its existence. It can be a rate regulation, but if you take that to the limits it is on a continuum between existence (maximum rate of occurrence) and non-existence (zero rate of occurrence), and is thus a similar causal type to the origin or creation of a system. Is it fair to say that a catalyst regulates existence? This gives a definition that is general to both hard and soft fields.

I am writing more on this, but will finish it later….

John

On Dec 15, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

John,

Apologies if you have already done so and I missed it but with regard to the framework could you please address the notion of a catalyst?

Jack

From: John Jay Kineman [mailto:john.kineman]
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 3:00 PM
To: Steve Wallis, PhD
Cc: Ken Lloyd; Lenard Troncale; Gary Langford; Jack Ring; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; Bill Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf;david.rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

Hi Steve,

I also rebel somewhat at rigid labeling of theory, model, schema, etc.; although I suppose they have value in relative terms. So lately I’ve been discussing ‘frameworks’ for sustainability science. A common Socio-ecological integral framework is the DPSIR ‘schema'(?) Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response. I’ve mapped that into a more standard four quadrant causality which seems to be much more fundamental and ubiquitous. But its problematic even to call it a ‘causality’ as narrower definitions of cause limit that to mechanical/material causes that, indeed, enforce rules like A and B can’t simultaneously cause each other; whereas in fact in nature we know they can.

The resolution is certainly going to additional causes that allow it to happen in a complex system (this is fundamental in Rosen’s theory for example), but that gets up the fir for traditional scientists who don’t want to go ‘soft’. The distinction between a ‘simple’ system in which A and B cannot be mutually causal (relates to the definition of a mechanism) and a ‘complex’ system in which they can be is crucial in my view. We could even say that complex systems are most fundamentally characterized by loop causalities (which then explains the other commonly observed properties of non-linearity, surprise, resilience, emergence, informatics, etc.).

Being semi-retired and basically cantankerous I just ignore all the traditional nail biting and say there are four kinds of causation in nature; get over it. But of course that doesn’t work for everyone, and there’s so little good work developing it that I really can’t expect it to be at all ‘standard’ thinking as much as I would like it to be (its currently expanding quite a bit though). Even in my class I was very reluctant to teach it until by nibbling around the edges via other ‘frameworks’, including PAR, I found it unavoidable. Perhaps that’s just the inevitability of my own beliefs emerging when forced to be honest, but so far its working and I’m finding it to be very teachable; without which we would be struggling for a focus in a survey of many different kinds of socio-ecological system.

I need to know more about what Len and this group have been doing. I am certainly derelict in not having done so earlier, but the exigencies of time and wading through one’s own swamp have their say.

Meanwhile, I found this Japanese work to be quite amazingly similar, even down to use of the 4-quad model, schema, theory, framework, world-view, meta-model or whatever it is. It works. They took their model from Ken Wilber (another Boulder resident I might add). From what I’ve done I think we can put much more rigor into Wilber’s model. He developed it, like Aristotle, as a way of classifying causal aspects of reality, but neither have been explicit about its loop causality. Aristotle framed it as a hierarchy, which most of the Western world adopted, with the result of requiring that a line be drawn at some level in the hierarchy to distinguish what was in the world of science and knowledge and what was transcendent and unreachable. When properly entailed as a closed cycle of causation, however, those problems go away. The transcendence is then in the 5th cause – the loop itself; why nature invented loop causality and self-emergence. Even the Veda does not consider that knowable other than some urge to exist.

Fortunately, and I think rather surprisingly, these authors chose to make their entire book free in digital form. I highly recommend taking a look or a scan. Perhaps some will already know of it and have some comment. Here’s the link http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-4-431-54340-4

I would also append the book itself but it is over 4MB so it might not make it through some email filters.

Cheers,
John

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Jack,

I think the problem with that is “what does the tickling”. What makes it go. The relational framework is self-motivating; each causal aspect drives the next in a cycle, so it answers the question ‘why’ something happens. In this model, there would be no static configurations.

Regarding the law-like process, that simply says that for everything you can ask questions about, one of the questions you can ask (and find answers to) is “how does it behave”.

I am less certain of the ‘law-like’ part — what I mean is we can find laws, but I’m not saying they would form a completely formalizable set.

Cheers,
John

On Dec 16, 2014, at 5:25 PM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

John,Whew! I will respond to the first two paragraphs now and will have to consider the rest later.
Perhaps this first response will make further interchange unnecessary.
I do not disagree with relational framework as you represent it. However, a difference in our views is rooted in “It would also have a law-like process associated with its temporal behavior.” I make a distinction between having a process and executing a process. In my mental model this is similar to potential energy vs. kinetic energy.
In my view a system exists when and while a configuration is responding to a stimulus then reverts to a configuration (which may be, usually is, different from before).
I do not claim that this is a popular perspective, only that I have found it quite useful in sorting out many misunderstandings among practitioners. A configuration can reflect all 4 or 5 aspects. It just doesn’t laugh until tickled.
OBTW, like us it can’t tickle itself.
Make sense?

On Dec 16, 2014, at 5:01 PM, John Jay Kineman <John.Kineman> wrote:

Jack,

I’d be interested in this distinction between a system and a configuration of end items.
In the relational framework, there are four archetypal ways of pointing to something systemic; four kinds or aspects to reality. These are never separate, except that we can see their separate aspects. But one of them could not exist without the other three – it is a natural unit that when seen or interacted interacts or gets seen in one of these four ways depending on how we approach it. So, if I ask about something we’ll label as X, X would have a measurable, material aspect to it. It would also have a law-like process associated with its temporal behavior. It would also have a certain design, parameters, or shape to its associated laws, and it would have some precedent structure that acquired a role in a larger system that, in a sense, gave it meaning and specification as X4 (the whole of X). Additionally, it would have a 5th aspect which is some transcendent quality associated with the whole – identity or ‘self’ primitive as those might be.

That’s the holon philosophy. If we decide to think that way, even for experimental purposes, then a “configuration of end items” would be its material aspect, whereas a “system” would imply all 4 or 5 aspects. But, in theory, there can’t be one without all, although we may have to look pretty far throughout nature to find them all (the theory does not say they need to be co-located or bound together by a skin as organisms are, just that they theoretically exist in nature, otherwise none of the aspects could exist).

So, perhaps by explaining it this way I can get across the idea that there is a way of looking at and for ‘whole’ systems, and yet we will commonly see fractions of systems. Also, the supposedly ‘whole’ entailments are not absolute or unique. If there were only one set of 4 aspects for a given occurrence, it would be completely isolated from everything else. We could not know of it. The 4 aspects are causalities, i.e., ways of knowing or interacting in nature. So, to be interactive (or known) it must have entailments with other such whole systems. It then meets Arthur Koestler’s concept of holon, which is both part and whole at the same time. It has a holistic property – the identity holon that labels it as a unique system – and also interactive properties that link it to other systems to form larger and smaller systems.

In practice, the idea is not so strange as it might sound. We identify a natural object by its measurable properties and by what we can infer about its laws of origin and behavior. That’s at least half of the holon, and sometimes 3/4ths if we get into system-dependent laws. The critical missing element is the 4th quadrant – final cause – which has had so much misunderstanding since 1000BC that most scientists have discarded it and won’t think about it. But even in its rather anthropomorphic label as “purpose” we know we can’t really get rid of it, certainly not in soft systems. Hard systems are essentially defined by getting rid of it. In doing that, what we are really doing is separating the origin of a system from its operation and working only with its operation (also associated with the idea of ‘configuration’). We are no longer working with its deeper “organization” (as Rosen emphasized), which would involve its origin and system identity. In fact, for all mechanistic systems we pushed that origin and organization back to the big bang to get rid of it in ‘practical’ science. Since then, so the story goes, it has only been a matter of ‘reconfiguration’ and thus we can look for a single set of natural laws that describe reconfiguration of already created objects or energies. Not surprisingly, as we calculate such reconfiguration, which uses energy, we calculate that such a system must run down and eventually be exhausted. Obviously that is the case if we have eliminated all possibility of new origins.

Then we have quite a bit of difficulty when it comes to living and cognitive systems because it is hard to talk about them without referring to some kind of origin. Origin of species, new ideas, etc. These are origin problems and traditional science eliminated origin problems, so there is tremendous controversy about vitalism and the like being un-scientific, or at least there has been. But what could be more obvious than the fact that we can’t talk about origins in science if we define science only as reconfiguration after everything has originated? So that is the root of our confusion.

Formal and final cause put origin back into science, but how to do it without making it all arbitrary? To put it back together we have to un-do a huge mistake that was made in 1000BC. That mistake led to a tremendous era of material discovery and understanding, but it blinded us to origins. It was to imagine causality as a hierarchy from an infinite unknowable creator down to precisely knowable matter and energy. In earlier times, the scientific world view was not hierarchical like that, it was cyclical. The creator was nature itself. Final cause stems from material existence. It is the meaning of a material existence with regard to some larger system (context). That is also the ancient idea of karma. The past shapes the purpose and direction of the future. It may seem like an anthropomorphic view because we are most familiar with that kind of think in human affairs. However, what if humans evolved from nature and now reflect its already established fundamental properties? Then it may not be so wrong to associate at least very deep principles we can learn from humanity, with properties of nature. Where else did they come from?

On that level, as I’ve described it so far, the relational view might be taken as the ultimate atheism. Whereas the Western view pushed God out of nature and before the big bang, this idea seems to eliminate the concept altogether and replace it with nested whole natural systems. But it is actually not atheism, because the infinity still exists; it is just brought into the natural system instead of being pushed out of it. It is actually more compatible with modern contemplative religious thought. But like the hierarchical idea it is still possible to do science short of running into the infinities. In old science we could look at mechanisms without running into infinities. We could not look at consciousness or life without encountering them. In the relational view we can look at life and consciousness without running into the infinite regress of larger and smaller systems. They are still there, implicitly, but the method of whole analysis allows us to construct proximal relations and leave the infinities as more remote effects. So it expands science.

Sorry for such an involved explanation of the holon view in answer to a simple question, but it seems unproductive to keep saying what relational theory says about various things without saying why it says it and giving the view that is required for understanding it. If relational theory is viewed from a traditional mechanistic world view, it can only appear to be mystical and untestable, because it refers to causes that are outside the mechanistic world view — those are the contextual causes (final-formal entailments that comprise the contextual aspect) and (functor encoding/decoding) relations between context and realization. The relations between context and realization are strictly informational in nature – they are not causal relations at all. The relation between a blueprint and the actions involved in construction is not causal, it is informational and acts as a constraint on those dynamics. The same is true, I would think, of a catalyst. It provides the general conditions in which a completely separate process can occur. It does not cause the process to occur, but enables and allows it to occur. The process may not occur with the catalyst (if the process isn’t right), and the process could occur without the catalyst, which only makes the process more likely. That’s typical of an information relation. Its like knowing there is a sale on at the grocery store does not cause you to go there and buy the sale items, but it can act as a catalyst to increase the likelihood that you will.

Now, I’m no chemist, but I can imagine there are many reactions that are pretty darn certain given the catalyst – they don’t seem to have the uncertainty I indicated above. That does not violate the theory. Information relations can become reduced by a lot of environmental constraints and can begin to act mechanically. A complex system can mimic a mechanism. In that case, the tendency is to write the equations for the catalyst together with the equations for the process being catalyzed, treating them both as part of the same set of natural laws. Its an approximation, but we still call it a catalyst because it is a clearly defined different ingredient that doesn’t directly produce the result but allows it to happen. But when we translate the concept into the living and cognitive domain, we clearly introduce contextual differenes. Even in standard definitions of catalyst list one for chemistry and another for society “a person or thing that precipitates an event”. Obviously, a good comedian can precipitate a lot of fun and laughter, but not necessarily. He/she doesn’t cause the fun and laughter, it is caused within each participant if they are in the mood for that kind of environment. Obviously with chemistry and lower organisms some ‘moods’ are pretty darn reliable, so it seems to be a mechanical connection in those cases.

So, if that helps somewhat and doesn’t serve to just make the relational idea seem even more remote, then perhaps the answer to this question about catalyst being a system or material can be easily answered with the word “yes”. As a catalytic system it would certainly have a material aspect. But it is not the material aspect that is directly associated with the catalytic effect; it is the context of that material aspect that is influencing the process. Example: lets take snow. Snow does not cause skiing. But the contextual aspect of a snowy, hilly environment enables it, induces it, if people want to ski. Its even a necessary environment. But a mechanical analysis would simply write an equation for the amount of snow that correlates with the amount of skiing, as if one caused the other. Then, to be honest, we would have to add an uncertainty factor.

Yours,
John

Dr. John J. Kineman
Senior Research Scientist
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado
john.kineman
(Ph) 303-443-7544: (M) 303-586-4969

On Dec 16, 2014, at 7:22 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

Ken, Can you please describe an example? It may elucidate catalyst or question the whether it is in fact a system as contrasted to a configuration of end items.
Jack
On Dec 15, 2014, at 7:52 PM, Ken Lloyd <kalloyd> wrote:

Jack,

We have some examples where the morphism between the system and its context(s) morphs, leaving both the system and contexts unchanged. This in some sense affects the behavior and evolution of the system. Perhaps this is what the conversation means by the term “catalyst”. But, my interpretation is far from certain.

Ken

From: Jack Ring [mailto:jring7]
Sent: Monday, December 15, 2014 5:47 PM
To: John Jay Kineman
Cc: Steve Wallis, PhD; Len Troncale; Gary Langford; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; William Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf; David Rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby; Ken Lloyd
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

When a system acts on its context then the context morphs. Further, the action can result in the system morphing too. However, a catalyst is not affected by its participation in any interaction, never morphs. Rather like a field than an object. Perhaps a catalyst influences existence but not regulates it per se.
Am I misinterpreting your response?

On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:27 PM, John Jay Kineman <John.Kineman> wrote:

Hi Jack,

You asked how R-theory would treat the notion of a catalyst. Here’s what occurs to me.

The short answer is that a catalyst is formal cause. It is one system providing a context for the existence or regulation of another system. It thus corresponds with quadrant 3 in the holon diagram, the expression (decoding) of a model. Every natural system has formal cause and thus the equivalent of a catalyst – it is the aspect of contextual system that allows the material system to exist, or limits or regulates its existence. It can be a rate regulation, but if you take that to the limits it is on a continuum between existence (maximum rate of occurrence) and non-existence (zero rate of occurrence), and is thus a similar causal type to the origin or creation of a system. Is it fair to say that a catalyst regulates existence? This gives a definition that is general to both hard and soft fields.

I am writing more on this, but will finish it later….

John

On Dec 15, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

John,

Apologies if you have already done so and I missed it but with regard to the framework could you please address the notion of a catalyst?

Jack

From: John Jay Kineman [mailto:john.kineman]
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 3:00 PM
To: Steve Wallis, PhD
Cc: Ken Lloyd; Lenard Troncale; Gary Langford; Jack Ring; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; Bill Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf;david.rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

Hi Steve,

I also rebel somewhat at rigid labeling of theory, model, schema, etc.; although I suppose they have value in relative terms. So lately I’ve been discussing ‘frameworks’ for sustainability science. A common Socio-ecological integral framework is the DPSIR ‘schema'(?) Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response. I’ve mapped that into a more standard four quadrant causality which seems to be much more fundamental and ubiquitous. But its problematic even to call it a ‘causality’ as narrower definitions of cause limit that to mechanical/material causes that, indeed, enforce rules like A and B can’t simultaneously cause each other; whereas in fact in nature we know they can.

The resolution is certainly going to additional causes that allow it to happen in a complex system (this is fundamental in Rosen’s theory for example), but that gets up the fir for traditional scientists who don’t want to go ‘soft’. The distinction between a ‘simple’ system in which A and B cannot be mutually causal (relates to the definition of a mechanism) and a ‘complex’ system in which they can be is crucial in my view. We could even say that complex systems are most fundamentally characterized by loop causalities (which then explains the other commonly observed properties of non-linearity, surprise, resilience, emergence, informatics, etc.).

Being semi-retired and basically cantankerous I just ignore all the traditional nail biting and say there are four kinds of causation in nature; get over it. But of course that doesn’t work for everyone, and there’s so little good work developing it that I really can’t expect it to be at all ‘standard’ thinking as much as I would like it to be (its currently expanding quite a bit though). Even in my class I was very reluctant to teach it until by nibbling around the edges via other ‘frameworks’, including PAR, I found it unavoidable. Perhaps that’s just the inevitability of my own beliefs emerging when forced to be honest, but so far its working and I’m finding it to be very teachable; without which we would be struggling for a focus in a survey of many different kinds of socio-ecological system.

I need to know more about what Len and this group have been doing. I am certainly derelict in not having done so earlier, but the exigencies of time and wading through one’s own swamp have their say.

Meanwhile, I found this Japanese work to be quite amazingly similar, even down to use of the 4-quad model, schema, theory, framework, world-view, meta-model or whatever it is. It works. They took their model from Ken Wilber (another Boulder resident I might add). From what I’ve done I think we can put much more rigor into Wilber’s model. He developed it, like Aristotle, as a way of classifying causal aspects of reality, but neither have been explicit about its loop causality. Aristotle framed it as a hierarchy, which most of the Western world adopted, with the result of requiring that a line be drawn at some level in the hierarchy to distinguish what was in the world of science and knowledge and what was transcendent and unreachable. When properly entailed as a closed cycle of causation, however, those problems go away. The transcendence is then in the 5th cause – the loop itself; why nature invented loop causality and self-emergence. Even the Veda does not consider that knowable other than some urge to exist.

Fortunately, and I think rather surprisingly, these authors chose to make their entire book free in digital form. I highly recommend taking a look or a scan. Perhaps some will already know of it and have some comment. Here’s the link http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-4-431-54340-4

I would also append the book itself but it is over 4MB so it might not make it through some email filters.

Cheers,
John

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG – www.avg.com
Version: 2015.0.5577 / Virus Database: 4253/8741 – Release Date: 12/15/14

John,Whew! I will respond to the first two paragraphs now and will have to consider the rest later.
Perhaps this first response will make further interchange unnecessary.
I do not disagree with relational framework as you represent it. However, a difference in our views is rooted in “It would also have a law-like process associated with its temporal behavior.” I make a distinction between having a process and executing a process. In my mental model this is similar to potential energy vs. kinetic energy.
In my view a system exists when and while a configuration is responding to a stimulus then reverts to a configuration (which may be, usually is, different from before).
I do not claim that this is a popular perspective, only that I have found it quite useful in sorting out many misunderstandings among practitioners. A configuration can reflect all 4 or 5 aspects. It just doesn’t laugh until tickled.
OBTW, like us it can’t tickle itself.
Make sense?

On Dec 16, 2014, at 5:01 PM, John Jay Kineman <John.Kineman> wrote:

Jack,

I’d be interested in this distinction between a system and a configuration of end items.
In the relational framework, there are four archetypal ways of pointing to something systemic; four kinds or aspects to reality. These are never separate, except that we can see their separate aspects. But one of them could not exist without the other three – it is a natural unit that when seen or interacted interacts or gets seen in one of these four ways depending on how we approach it. So, if I ask about something we’ll label as X, X would have a measurable, material aspect to it. It would also have a law-like process associated with its temporal behavior. It would also have a certain design, parameters, or shape to its associated laws, and it would have some precedent structure that acquired a role in a larger system that, in a sense, gave it meaning and specification as X4 (the whole of X). Additionally, it would have a 5th aspect which is some transcendent quality associated with the whole – identity or ‘self’ primitive as those might be.

That’s the holon philosophy. If we decide to think that way, even for experimental purposes, then a “configuration of end items” would be its material aspect, whereas a “system” would imply all 4 or 5 aspects. But, in theory, there can’t be one without all, although we may have to look pretty far throughout nature to find them all (the theory does not say they need to be co-located or bound together by a skin as organisms are, just that they theoretically exist in nature, otherwise none of the aspects could exist).

So, perhaps by explaining it this way I can get across the idea that there is a way of looking at and for ‘whole’ systems, and yet we will commonly see fractions of systems. Also, the supposedly ‘whole’ entailments are not absolute or unique. If there were only one set of 4 aspects for a given occurrence, it would be completely isolated from everything else. We could not know of it. The 4 aspects are causalities, i.e., ways of knowing or interacting in nature. So, to be interactive (or known) it must have entailments with other such whole systems. It then meets Arthur Koestler’s concept of holon, which is both part and whole at the same time. It has a holistic property – the identity holon that labels it as a unique system – and also interactive properties that link it to other systems to form larger and smaller systems.

In practice, the idea is not so strange as it might sound. We identify a natural object by its measurable properties and by what we can infer about its laws of origin and behavior. That’s at least half of the holon, and sometimes 3/4ths if we get into system-dependent laws. The critical missing element is the 4th quadrant – final cause – which has had so much misunderstanding since 1000BC that most scientists have discarded it and won’t think about it. But even in its rather anthropomorphic label as “purpose” we know we can’t really get rid of it, certainly not in soft systems. Hard systems are essentially defined by getting rid of it. In doing that, what we are really doing is separating the origin of a system from its operation and working only with its operation (also associated with the idea of ‘configuration’). We are no longer working with its deeper “organization” (as Rosen emphasized), which would involve its origin and system identity. In fact, for all mechanistic systems we pushed that origin and organization back to the big bang to get rid of it in ‘practical’ science. Since then, so the story goes, it has only been a matter of ‘reconfiguration’ and thus we can look for a single set of natural laws that describe reconfiguration of already created objects or energies. Not surprisingly, as we calculate such reconfiguration, which uses energy, we calculate that such a system must run down and eventually be exhausted. Obviously that is the case if we have eliminated all possibility of new origins.

Then we have quite a bit of difficulty when it comes to living and cognitive systems because it is hard to talk about them without referring to some kind of origin. Origin of species, new ideas, etc. These are origin problems and traditional science eliminated origin problems, so there is tremendous controversy about vitalism and the like being un-scientific, or at least there has been. But what could be more obvious than the fact that we can’t talk about origins in science if we define science only as reconfiguration after everything has originated? So that is the root of our confusion.

Formal and final cause put origin back into science, but how to do it without making it all arbitrary? To put it back together we have to un-do a huge mistake that was made in 1000BC. That mistake led to a tremendous era of material discovery and understanding, but it blinded us to origins. It was to imagine causality as a hierarchy from an infinite unknowable creator down to precisely knowable matter and energy. In earlier times, the scientific world view was not hierarchical like that, it was cyclical. The creator was nature itself. Final cause stems from material existence. It is the meaning of a material existence with regard to some larger system (context). That is also the ancient idea of karma. The past shapes the purpose and direction of the future. It may seem like an anthropomorphic view because we are most familiar with that kind of think in human affairs. However, what if humans evolved from nature and now reflect its already established fundamental properties? Then it may not be so wrong to associate at least very deep principles we can learn from humanity, with properties of nature. Where else did they come from?

On that level, as I’ve described it so far, the relational view might be taken as the ultimate atheism. Whereas the Western view pushed God out of nature and before the big bang, this idea seems to eliminate the concept altogether and replace it with nested whole natural systems. But it is actually not atheism, because the infinity still exists; it is just brought into the natural system instead of being pushed out of it. It is actually more compatible with modern contemplative religious thought. But like the hierarchical idea it is still possible to do science short of running into the infinities. In old science we could look at mechanisms without running into infinities. We could not look at consciousness or life without encountering them. In the relational view we can look at life and consciousness without running into the infinite regress of larger and smaller systems. They are still there, implicitly, but the method of whole analysis allows us to construct proximal relations and leave the infinities as more remote effects. So it expands science.

Sorry for such an involved explanation of the holon view in answer to a simple question, but it seems unproductive to keep saying what relational theory says about various things without saying why it says it and giving the view that is required for understanding it. If relational theory is viewed from a traditional mechanistic world view, it can only appear to be mystical and untestable, because it refers to causes that are outside the mechanistic world view — those are the contextual causes (final-formal entailments that comprise the contextual aspect) and (functor encoding/decoding) relations between context and realization. The relations between context and realization are strictly informational in nature – they are not causal relations at all. The relation between a blueprint and the actions involved in construction is not causal, it is informational and acts as a constraint on those dynamics. The same is true, I would think, of a catalyst. It provides the general conditions in which a completely separate process can occur. It does not cause the process to occur, but enables and allows it to occur. The process may not occur with the catalyst (if the process isn’t right), and the process could occur without the catalyst, which only makes the process more likely. That’s typical of an information relation. Its like knowing there is a sale on at the grocery store does not cause you to go there and buy the sale items, but it can act as a catalyst to increase the likelihood that you will.

Now, I’m no chemist, but I can imagine there are many reactions that are pretty darn certain given the catalyst – they don’t seem to have the uncertainty I indicated above. That does not violate the theory. Information relations can become reduced by a lot of environmental constraints and can begin to act mechanically. A complex system can mimic a mechanism. In that case, the tendency is to write the equations for the catalyst together with the equations for the process being catalyzed, treating them both as part of the same set of natural laws. Its an approximation, but we still call it a catalyst because it is a clearly defined different ingredient that doesn’t directly produce the result but allows it to happen. But when we translate the concept into the living and cognitive domain, we clearly introduce contextual differenes. Even in standard definitions of catalyst list one for chemistry and another for society “a person or thing that precipitates an event”. Obviously, a good comedian can precipitate a lot of fun and laughter, but not necessarily. He/she doesn’t cause the fun and laughter, it is caused within each participant if they are in the mood for that kind of environment. Obviously with chemistry and lower organisms some ‘moods’ are pretty darn reliable, so it seems to be a mechanical connection in those cases.

So, if that helps somewhat and doesn’t serve to just make the relational idea seem even more remote, then perhaps the answer to this question about catalyst being a system or material can be easily answered with the word “yes”. As a catalytic system it would certainly have a material aspect. But it is not the material aspect that is directly associated with the catalytic effect; it is the context of that material aspect that is influencing the process. Example: lets take snow. Snow does not cause skiing. But the contextual aspect of a snowy, hilly environment enables it, induces it, if people want to ski. Its even a necessary environment. But a mechanical analysis would simply write an equation for the amount of snow that correlates with the amount of skiing, as if one caused the other. Then, to be honest, we would have to add an uncertainty factor.

Yours,
John

Dr. John J. Kineman
Senior Research Scientist
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado
john.kineman
(Ph) 303-443-7544: (M) 303-586-4969

On Dec 16, 2014, at 7:22 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

Ken, Can you please describe an example? It may elucidate catalyst or question the whether it is in fact a system as contrasted to a configuration of end items.
Jack
On Dec 15, 2014, at 7:52 PM, Ken Lloyd <kalloyd> wrote:

Jack,

We have some examples where the morphism between the system and its context(s) morphs, leaving both the system and contexts unchanged. This in some sense affects the behavior and evolution of the system. Perhaps this is what the conversation means by the term “catalyst”. But, my interpretation is far from certain.

Ken

From: Jack Ring [mailto:jring7]
Sent: Monday, December 15, 2014 5:47 PM
To: John Jay Kineman
Cc: Steve Wallis, PhD; Len Troncale; Gary Langford; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; William Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf; David Rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby; Ken Lloyd
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

When a system acts on its context then the context morphs. Further, the action can result in the system morphing too. However, a catalyst is not affected by its participation in any interaction, never morphs. Rather like a field than an object. Perhaps a catalyst influences existence but not regulates it per se.
Am I misinterpreting your response?

On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:27 PM, John Jay Kineman <John.Kineman> wrote:

Hi Jack,

You asked how R-theory would treat the notion of a catalyst. Here’s what occurs to me.

The short answer is that a catalyst is formal cause. It is one system providing a context for the existence or regulation of another system. It thus corresponds with quadrant 3 in the holon diagram, the expression (decoding) of a model. Every natural system has formal cause and thus the equivalent of a catalyst – it is the aspect of contextual system that allows the material system to exist, or limits or regulates its existence. It can be a rate regulation, but if you take that to the limits it is on a continuum between existence (maximum rate of occurrence) and non-existence (zero rate of occurrence), and is thus a similar causal type to the origin or creation of a system. Is it fair to say that a catalyst regulates existence? This gives a definition that is general to both hard and soft fields.

I am writing more on this, but will finish it later….

John

On Dec 15, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

John,

Apologies if you have already done so and I missed it but with regard to the framework could you please address the notion of a catalyst?

Jack

From: John Jay Kineman [mailto:john.kineman]
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 3:00 PM
To: Steve Wallis, PhD
Cc: Ken Lloyd; Lenard Troncale; Gary Langford; Jack Ring; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; Bill Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf;david.rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

Hi Steve,

I also rebel somewhat at rigid labeling of theory, model, schema, etc.; although I suppose they have value in relative terms. So lately I’ve been discussing ‘frameworks’ for sustainability science. A common Socio-ecological integral framework is the DPSIR ‘schema'(?) Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response. I’ve mapped that into a more standard four quadrant causality which seems to be much more fundamental and ubiquitous. But its problematic even to call it a ‘causality’ as narrower definitions of cause limit that to mechanical/material causes that, indeed, enforce rules like A and B can’t simultaneously cause each other; whereas in fact in nature we know they can.

The resolution is certainly going to additional causes that allow it to happen in a complex system (this is fundamental in Rosen’s theory for example), but that gets up the fir for traditional scientists who don’t want to go ‘soft’. The distinction between a ‘simple’ system in which A and B cannot be mutually causal (relates to the definition of a mechanism) and a ‘complex’ system in which they can be is crucial in my view. We could even say that complex systems are most fundamentally characterized by loop causalities (which then explains the other commonly observed properties of non-linearity, surprise, resilience, emergence, informatics, etc.).

Being semi-retired and basically cantankerous I just ignore all the traditional nail biting and say there are four kinds of causation in nature; get over it. But of course that doesn’t work for everyone, and there’s so little good work developing it that I really can’t expect it to be at all ‘standard’ thinking as much as I would like it to be (its currently expanding quite a bit though). Even in my class I was very reluctant to teach it until by nibbling around the edges via other ‘frameworks’, including PAR, I found it unavoidable. Perhaps that’s just the inevitability of my own beliefs emerging when forced to be honest, but so far its working and I’m finding it to be very teachable; without which we would be struggling for a focus in a survey of many different kinds of socio-ecological system.

I need to know more about what Len and this group have been doing. I am certainly derelict in not having done so earlier, but the exigencies of time and wading through one’s own swamp have their say.

Meanwhile, I found this Japanese work to be quite amazingly similar, even down to use of the 4-quad model, schema, theory, framework, world-view, meta-model or whatever it is. It works. They took their model from Ken Wilber (another Boulder resident I might add). From what I’ve done I think we can put much more rigor into Wilber’s model. He developed it, like Aristotle, as a way of classifying causal aspects of reality, but neither have been explicit about its loop causality. Aristotle framed it as a hierarchy, which most of the Western world adopted, with the result of requiring that a line be drawn at some level in the hierarchy to distinguish what was in the world of science and knowledge and what was transcendent and unreachable. When properly entailed as a closed cycle of causation, however, those problems go away. The transcendence is then in the 5th cause – the loop itself; why nature invented loop causality and self-emergence. Even the Veda does not consider that knowable other than some urge to exist.

Fortunately, and I think rather surprisingly, these authors chose to make their entire book free in digital form. I highly recommend taking a look or a scan. Perhaps some will already know of it and have some comment. Here’s the link http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-4-431-54340-4

I would also append the book itself but it is over 4MB so it might not make it through some email filters.

Cheers,
John

No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG – www.avg.com
Version: 2015.0.5577 / Virus Database: 4253/8741 – Release Date: 12/15/14

Jack,

I’d be interested in this distinction between a system and a configuration of end items.
In the relational framework, there are four archetypal ways of pointing to something systemic; four kinds or aspects to reality. These are never separate, except that we can see their separate aspects. But one of them could not exist without the other three – it is a natural unit that when seen or interacted interacts or gets seen in one of these four ways depending on how we approach it. So, if I ask about something we’ll label as X, X would have a measurable, material aspect to it. It would also have a law-like process associated with its temporal behavior. It would also have a certain design, parameters, or shape to its associated laws, and it would have some precedent structure that acquired a role in a larger system that, in a sense, gave it meaning and specification as X4 (the whole of X). Additionally, it would have a 5th aspect which is some transcendent quality associated with the whole – identity or ‘self’ primitive as those might be.

That’s the holon philosophy. If we decide to think that way, even for experimental purposes, then a “configuration of end items” would be its material aspect, whereas a “system” would imply all 4 or 5 aspects. But, in theory, there can’t be one without all, although we may have to look pretty far throughout nature to find them all (the theory does not say they need to be co-located or bound together by a skin as organisms are, just that they theoretically exist in nature, otherwise none of the aspects could exist).

So, perhaps by explaining it this way I can get across the idea that there is a way of looking at and for ‘whole’ systems, and yet we will commonly see fractions of systems. Also, the supposedly ‘whole’ entailments are not absolute or unique. If there were only one set of 4 aspects for a given occurrence, it would be completely isolated from everything else. We could not know of it. The 4 aspects are causalities, i.e., ways of knowing or interacting in nature. So, to be interactive (or known) it must have entailments with other such whole systems. It then meets Arthur Koestler’s concept of holon, which is both part and whole at the same time. It has a holistic property – the identity holon that labels it as a unique system – and also interactive properties that link it to other systems to form larger and smaller systems.

In practice, the idea is not so strange as it might sound. We identify a natural object by its measurable properties and by what we can infer about its laws of origin and behavior. That’s at least half of the holon, and sometimes 3/4ths if we get into system-dependent laws. The critical missing element is the 4th quadrant – final cause – which has had so much misunderstanding since 1000BC that most scientists have discarded it and won’t think about it. But even in its rather anthropomorphic label as “purpose” we know we can’t really get rid of it, certainly not in soft systems. Hard systems are essentially defined by getting rid of it. In doing that, what we are really doing is separating the origin of a system from its operation and working only with its operation (also associated with the idea of ‘configuration’). We are no longer working with its deeper “organization” (as Rosen emphasized), which would involve its origin and system identity. In fact, for all mechanistic systems we pushed that origin and organization back to the big bang to get rid of it in ‘practical’ science. Since then, so the story goes, it has only been a matter of ‘reconfiguration’ and thus we can look for a single set of natural laws that describe reconfiguration of already created objects or energies. Not surprisingly, as we calculate such reconfiguration, which uses energy, we calculate that such a system must run down and eventually be exhausted. Obviously that is the case if we have eliminated all possibility of new origins.

Then we have quite a bit of difficulty when it comes to living and cognitive systems because it is hard to talk about them without referring to some kind of origin. Origin of species, new ideas, etc. These are origin problems and traditional science eliminated origin problems, so there is tremendous controversy about vitalism and the like being un-scientific, or at least there has been. But what could be more obvious than the fact that we can’t talk about origins in science if we define science only as reconfiguration after everything has originated? So that is the root of our confusion.

Formal and final cause put origin back into science, but how to do it without making it all arbitrary? To put it back together we have to un-do a huge mistake that was made in 1000BC. That mistake led to a tremendous era of material discovery and understanding, but it blinded us to origins. It was to imagine causality as a hierarchy from an infinite unknowable creator down to precisely knowable matter and energy. In earlier times, the scientific world view was not hierarchical like that, it was cyclical. The creator was nature itself. Final cause stems from material existence. It is the meaning of a material existence with regard to some larger system (context). That is also the ancient idea of karma. The past shapes the purpose and direction of the future. It may seem like an anthropomorphic view because we are most familiar with that kind of think in human affairs. However, what if humans evolved from nature and now reflect its already established fundamental properties? Then it may not be so wrong to associate at least very deep principles we can learn from humanity, with properties of nature. Where else did they come from?

On that level, as I’ve described it so far, the relational view might be taken as the ultimate atheism. Whereas the Western view pushed God out of nature and before the big bang, this idea seems to eliminate the concept altogether and replace it with nested whole natural systems. But it is actually not atheism, because the infinity still exists; it is just brought into the natural system instead of being pushed out of it. It is actually more compatible with modern contemplative religious thought. But like the hierarchical idea it is still possible to do science short of running into the infinities. In old science we could look at mechanisms without running into infinities. We could not look at consciousness or life without encountering them. In the relational view we can look at life and consciousness without running into the infinite regress of larger and smaller systems. They are still there, implicitly, but the method of whole analysis allows us to construct proximal relations and leave the infinities as more remote effects. So it expands science.

Sorry for such an involved explanation of the holon view in answer to a simple question, but it seems unproductive to keep saying what relational theory says about various things without saying why it says it and giving the view that is required for understanding it. If relational theory is viewed from a traditional mechanistic world view, it can only appear to be mystical and untestable, because it refers to causes that are outside the mechanistic world view — those are the contextual causes (final-formal entailments that comprise the contextual aspect) and (functor encoding/decoding) relations between context and realization. The relations between context and realization are strictly informational in nature – they are not causal relations at all. The relation between a blueprint and the actions involved in construction is not causal, it is informational and acts as a constraint on those dynamics. The same is true, I would think, of a catalyst. It provides the general conditions in which a completely separate process can occur. It does not cause the process to occur, but enables and allows it to occur. The process may not occur with the catalyst (if the process isn’t right), and the process could occur without the catalyst, which only makes the process more likely. That’s typical of an information relation. Its like knowing there is a sale on at the grocery store does not cause you to go there and buy the sale items, but it can act as a catalyst to increase the likelihood that you will.

Now, I’m no chemist, but I can imagine there are many reactions that are pretty darn certain given the catalyst – they don’t seem to have the uncertainty I indicated above. That does not violate the theory. Information relations can become reduced by a lot of environmental constraints and can begin to act mechanically. A complex system can mimic a mechanism. In that case, the tendency is to write the equations for the catalyst together with the equations for the process being catalyzed, treating them both as part of the same set of natural laws. Its an approximation, but we still call it a catalyst because it is a clearly defined different ingredient that doesn’t directly produce the result but allows it to happen. But when we translate the concept into the living and cognitive domain, we clearly introduce contextual differenes. Even in standard definitions of catalyst list one for chemistry and another for society “a person or thing that precipitates an event”. Obviously, a good comedian can precipitate a lot of fun and laughter, but not necessarily. He/she doesn’t cause the fun and laughter, it is caused within each participant if they are in the mood for that kind of environment. Obviously with chemistry and lower organisms some ‘moods’ are pretty darn reliable, so it seems to be a mechanical connection in those cases.

So, if that helps somewhat and doesn’t serve to just make the relational idea seem even more remote, then perhaps the answer to this question about catalyst being a system or material can be easily answered with the word “yes”. As a catalytic system it would certainly have a material aspect. But it is not the material aspect that is directly associated with the catalytic effect; it is the context of that material aspect that is influencing the process. Example: lets take snow. Snow does not cause skiing. But the contextual aspect of a snowy, hilly environment enables it, induces it, if people want to ski. Its even a necessary environment. But a mechanical analysis would simply write an equation for the amount of snow that correlates with the amount of skiing, as if one caused the other. Then, to be honest, we would have to add an uncertainty factor.

Yours,
John

Dr. John J. Kineman
Senior Research Scientist
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado
john.kineman
(Ph) 303-443-7544: (M) 303-586-4969

On Dec 16, 2014, at 7:22 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

Ken, Can you please describe an example? It may elucidate catalyst or question the whether it is in fact a system as contrasted to a configuration of end items.
Jack
On Dec 15, 2014, at 7:52 PM, Ken Lloyd <kalloyd> wrote:

Jack,

We have some examples where the morphism between the system and its context(s) morphs, leaving both the system and contexts unchanged. This in some sense affects the behavior and evolution of the system. Perhaps this is what the conversation means by the term “catalyst”. But, my interpretation is far from certain.

Ken

From: Jack Ring [mailto:jring7]
Sent: Monday, December 15, 2014 5:47 PM
To: John Jay Kineman
Cc: Steve Wallis, PhD; Len Troncale; Gary Langford; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; William Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf; David Rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby; Ken Lloyd
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

When a system acts on its context then the context morphs. Further, the action can result in the system morphing too. However, a catalyst is not affected by its participation in any interaction, never morphs. Rather like a field than an object. Perhaps a catalyst influences existence but not regulates it per se.
Am I misinterpreting your response?

On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:27 PM, John Jay Kineman <John.Kineman> wrote:

Hi Jack,

You asked how R-theory would treat the notion of a catalyst. Here’s what occurs to me.

The short answer is that a catalyst is formal cause. It is one system providing a context for the existence or regulation of another system. It thus corresponds with quadrant 3 in the holon diagram, the expression (decoding) of a model. Every natural system has formal cause and thus the equivalent of a catalyst – it is the aspect of contextual system that allows the material system to exist, or limits or regulates its existence. It can be a rate regulation, but if you take that to the limits it is on a continuum between existence (maximum rate of occurrence) and non-existence (zero rate of occurrence), and is thus a similar causal type to the origin or creation of a system. Is it fair to say that a catalyst regulates existence? This gives a definition that is general to both hard and soft fields.

I am writing more on this, but will finish it later….

John

On Dec 15, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

John,

Apologies if you have already done so and I missed it but with regard to the framework could you please address the notion of a catalyst?

Jack

From: John Jay Kineman [mailto:john.kineman]
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 3:00 PM
To: Steve Wallis, PhD
Cc: Ken Lloyd; Lenard Troncale; Gary Langford; Jack Ring; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; Bill Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf;david.rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

Hi Steve,

I also rebel somewhat at rigid labeling of theory, model, schema, etc.; although I suppose they have value in relative terms. So lately I’ve been discussing ‘frameworks’ for sustainability science. A common Socio-ecological integral framework is the DPSIR ‘schema'(?) Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response. I’ve mapped that into a more standard four quadrant causality which seems to be much more fundamental and ubiquitous. But its problematic even to call it a ‘causality’ as narrower definitions of cause limit that to mechanical/material causes that, indeed, enforce rules like A and B can’t simultaneously cause each other; whereas in fact in nature we know they can.

The resolution is certainly going to additional causes that allow it to happen in a complex system (this is fundamental in Rosen’s theory for example), but that gets up the fir for traditional scientists who don’t want to go ‘soft’. The distinction between a ‘simple’ system in which A and B cannot be mutually causal (relates to the definition of a mechanism) and a ‘complex’ system in which they can be is crucial in my view. We could even say that complex systems are most fundamentally characterized by loop causalities (which then explains the other commonly observed properties of non-linearity, surprise, resilience, emergence, informatics, etc.).

Being semi-retired and basically cantankerous I just ignore all the traditional nail biting and say there are four kinds of causation in nature; get over it. But of course that doesn’t work for everyone, and there’s so little good work developing it that I really can’t expect it to be at all ‘standard’ thinking as much as I would like it to be (its currently expanding quite a bit though). Even in my class I was very reluctant to teach it until by nibbling around the edges via other ‘frameworks’, including PAR, I found it unavoidable. Perhaps that’s just the inevitability of my own beliefs emerging when forced to be honest, but so far its working and I’m finding it to be very teachable; without which we would be struggling for a focus in a survey of many different kinds of socio-ecological system.

I need to know more about what Len and this group have been doing. I am certainly derelict in not having done so earlier, but the exigencies of time and wading through one’s own swamp have their say.

Meanwhile, I found this Japanese work to be quite amazingly similar, even down to use of the 4-quad model, schema, theory, framework, world-view, meta-model or whatever it is. It works. They took their model from Ken Wilber (another Boulder resident I might add). From what I’ve done I think we can put much more rigor into Wilber’s model. He developed it, like Aristotle, as a way of classifying causal aspects of reality, but neither have been explicit about its loop causality. Aristotle framed it as a hierarchy, which most of the Western world adopted, with the result of requiring that a line be drawn at some level in the hierarchy to distinguish what was in the world of science and knowledge and what was transcendent and unreachable. When properly entailed as a closed cycle of causation, however, those problems go away. The transcendence is then in the 5th cause – the loop itself; why nature invented loop causality and self-emergence. Even the Veda does not consider that knowable other than some urge to exist.

Fortunately, and I think rather surprisingly, these authors chose to make their entire book free in digital form. I highly recommend taking a look or a scan. Perhaps some will already know of it and have some comment. Here’s the link http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-4-431-54340-4

I would also append the book itself but it is over 4MB so it might not make it through some email filters.

Cheers,
John

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Hi Jack,

You asked how R-theory would treat the notion of a catalyst. Here’s what occurs to me.

The short answer is that a catalyst is formal cause. It is one system providing a context for the existence or regulation of another system. It thus corresponds with quadrant 3 in the holon diagram, the expression (decoding) of a model. Every natural system has formal cause and thus the equivalent of a catalyst – it is the aspect of contextual system that allows the material system to exist, or limits or regulates its existence. It can be a rate regulation, but if you take that to the limits it is on a continuum between existence (maximum rate of occurrence) and non-existence (zero rate of occurrence), and is thus a similar causal type to the origin or creation of a system. Is it fair to say that a catalyst regulates existence? This gives a definition that is general to both hard and soft fields.

I am writing more on this, but will finish it later….

John

On Dec 15, 2014, at 8:21 AM, Jack Ring <jring7> wrote:

John,
Apologies if you have already done so and I missed it but with regard to the framework could you please address the notion of a catalyst?
Jack

From: John Jay Kineman [mailto:john.kineman]
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 3:00 PM
To: Steve Wallis, PhD
Cc: Ken Lloyd; Lenard Troncale; Gary Langford; Jack Ring; Josh Sparber; Richard Martin; Bill Schindel; Duane Hybertson; Gary Smith; James Martin; Tom Marzolf;david.rousseau; Richard Emerson; Kristin Giammarco; Kent Palmer; Luke Friendshuh; Janet Singer; Michael Singer; Harold; Lynn Rasmussen; David Ing; Jennifer Wilby
Subject: Re: Criteria for A GST2

Hi Steve,

I also rebel somewhat at rigid labeling of theory, model, schema, etc.; although I suppose they have value in relative terms. So lately I’ve been discussing ‘frameworks’ for sustainability science. A common Socio-ecological integral framework is the DPSIR ‘schema'(?) Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response. I’ve mapped that into a more standard four quadrant causality which seems to be much more fundamental and ubiquitous. But its problematic even to call it a ‘causality’ as narrower definitions of cause limit that to mechanical/material causes that, indeed, enforce rules like A and B can’t simultaneously cause each other; whereas in fact in nature we know they can.

The resolution is certainly going to additional causes that allow it to happen in a complex system (this is fundamental in Rosen’s theory for example), but that gets up the fir for traditional scientists who don’t want to go ‘soft’. The distinction between a ‘simple’ system in which A and B cannot be mutually causal (relates to the definition of a mechanism) and a ‘complex’ system in which they can be is crucial in my view. We could even say that complex systems are most fundamentally characterized by loop causalities (which then explains the other commonly observed properties of non-linearity, surprise, resilience, emergence, informatics, etc.).

Being semi-retired and basically cantankerous I just ignore all the traditional nail biting and say there are four kinds of causation in nature; get over it. But of course that doesn’t work for everyone, and there’s so little good work developing it that I really can’t expect it to be at all ‘standard’ thinking as much as I would like it to be (its currently expanding quite a bit though). Even in my class I was very reluctant to teach it until by nibbling around the edges via other ‘frameworks’, including PAR, I found it unavoidable. Perhaps that’s just the inevitability of my own beliefs emerging when forced to be honest, but so far its working and I’m finding it to be very teachable; without which we would be struggling for a focus in a survey of many different kinds of socio-ecological system.

I need to know more about what Len and this group have been doing. I am certainly derelict in not having done so earlier, but the exigencies of time and wading through one’s own swamp have their say.

Meanwhile, I found this Japanese work to be quite amazingly similar, even down to use of the 4-quad model, schema, theory, framework, world-view, meta-model or whatever it is. It works. They took their model from Ken Wilber (another Boulder resident I might add). From what I’ve done I think we can put much more rigor into Wilber’s model. He developed it, like Aristotle, as a way of classifying causal aspects of reality, but neither have been explicit about its loop causality. Aristotle framed it as a hierarchy, which most of the Western world adopted, with the result of requiring that a line be drawn at some level in the hierarchy to distinguish what was in the world of science and knowledge and what was transcendent and unreachable. When properly entailed as a closed cycle of causation, however, those problems go away. The transcendence is then in the 5th cause – the loop itself; why nature invented loop causality and self-emergence. Even the Veda does not consider that knowable other than some urge to exist.

Fortunately, and I think rather surprisingly, these authors chose to make their entire book free in digital form. I highly recommend taking a look or a scan. Perhaps some will already know of it and have some comment. Here’s the link http://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-4-431-54340-4

I would also append the book itself but it is over 4MB so it might not make it through some email filters.

Cheers,
John

A note on Derek Cabrera’s Theory of (absolutely) everything.

His video on Big Theory of Everything describes a relational holon, DSRP. http://www.cabreraresearch.org/tabs/videos However his labels are different from R-theory and Aristotle’s causes, but they are archetypically the same. The association is easy to see:

D – Distinctions: This is material cause, which is about measurable properties in a local ‘space’ context. The context does not have to be physics, it could be a cultural contexts that establishes coordinates to measure distinctions between people in the culture, etc.

S – Systems: Well, bad word because ‘systems’ can describe everything including DSRP, unless you use specialized language to distinguish that from meta-systems. But it is basically efficient cause. It is the laws of how distinctions behave and interact. In the physical world these are the natural laws. In a cultural context of distinctions it would be what those distinctions do, how they interact and develop as a set of distinctions over time.

R – Relations: This is formal cause. Relations in R-theory are defined differently, more specifically in the category theory as functors, but in this case relations are how the first two DW are constrained by context, which not only establishes the coordinates for making distinctions, it establishes the parameters for laws. It is the ‘shape’ or ‘form’ of the DS distinction-system. DS forms a category because it has two things that are sets (D) and morphisms (S).

P – Perspectives: This is final cause. Perspective establishes an observer, without which there is no perspective. An observer has an identity and purpose, or goal. That perspective did not simply arrive, it had to develop with the observer. Thus it has prior examples or exemplars. These constitute prior ‘ends’ of the system that establish information about possible ends of a future system. Perspective leads to vision, creative emergence, etc.

Now the thing is these four, taken most generally as Aristotle tried to do, are a hierarchical cycle. They are not a linear hierarchy as Aristotle unfortunately promoted and all followed. The creative cycle (deductive or decoding from model to realization), using Cabrera’s labels, is P-R-S-D-repeat The inductive cycle (encoding from specific properties to models) is the other way, D-S-R-P-repeat. The ‘forward’ creative cycle says what models and realizations do. The ‘reverse’ inductive cycle says where models and realizations came from. The answer in both cases is ‘models and realizations’, but the direction is different. One is about behavior, the other is about origin; the two things that make a system complex.

These are relational holons. The ‘natural’ holon is the creative cycle. It can be shown mathematically that the reverse, inductive cycle, can be accomplished in nature only by a living system, which is a fifth-order holon (matching Rosen’s diagram of life). In that kind of holon, each of the four quadrants can be performed by forward, natural sub-holons, which reverse the direction of the main holon, thus explaining induction by deduction.

Images from the ancient Vedic-Harappan civilization around 2800BC strongly correlate with these diagrams, as do rather precise descriptions in the Rig Veda and Upanishads. It is likely that the ancients understood the basic structure and function of reality in these terms.

The creative cycle looks like this (also showing corresponding Vedic/Harappan diagrams, 2800BC):
PastedGraphic-2.pdf
The reverse, inductive reasoning cycle looks like this (again showing corresponding Vedic/Harappan diagrams, 2800BC):
PastedGraphic-3.pdf