The basis for Autevolution: Live as an organizing causal process

Kineman, J. 1997. Theory of Autevolution

The basis for autevolution

Life as an organizing causal process

The basic assumption

Analogy with physics

The problem of disciplinary compartmentalization

In this section I investigate possible foundations for a theory
of autevolution in existing principles, particularly in quantum
physics. To do this, it is necessary to consider the basic assumptions
and underlying metaphysics of the overall paradigm.

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The basic assumption

It is clear from a close examination of philosophies of science
and epistemology that evolutionary (strong) Gaia must be defined
as a worldview (within which specific mechanistic theories may
then be possible). This does not presume to usurp the task from
researchers active in developing Gaian theories. It does, however,
undertake to isolate fundamental principles as characteristics
of these attempts in general.

While Gaia may be most often described phenomenalistically and
metaphorically, we may still be able to infer both new assumptions
and useful hypotheses from these descriptions, as did the neo-Darwinists
in defining natural selection and the mechanism of inheritance
from more general concepts of evolution. Strong forms of Gaia
involve a view of life as a creative and active agent
. From
this beginning alone it must be challenging to current theory;
but it must itself be challenged to propose an acceptable modification
to present assumptions and a viable process for its operation,
i.e., to allow theory development and confirmation.

What seems most characteristic about strong versions of Gaia is
the notion of an emergent property of living systems, not predicted
by current theory, whereby an ecosystem, or the biosphere as a
whole, may seem to act in a coordinated manner and tend to maintain
itself through its effect on resources. Our current theories,
including coevolution, do not easily extend such organismic behavior
to the system level, where evolution cannot proceed by the same
means as for reproductive organisms. The mechanism for deriving
large-scale organization from currently known processes is problematic,
mostly because of present assumptions about life, and the limitations
of theory mentioned earlier. Traditional theory treats biological
organization as an epiphenomenon, that is, a result of other causal
processes, but concepts of Gaia unanimously describe life itself
as an organizing causal process.

The Gaian view (described in terms of phenomena) implies a general
principle that life is fundamentally self-organizing; and,
in the strongest sense, that life is fundamentally self-determining
(Jantsch, 1980). It also
implies that living structures have the ability to manifest this
property to various degrees, at various levels of biological organization.
(That the process is exhibited significantly on a planetary scale
would then be a subsidiary hypothesis.) Many examples of organization,
self regulation, and environmental manipulation clearly exist
in the weak sense (i.e., treated by current theory as epiphenomena),
but as a theoretical construct the idea implies a radically new
principle in the definition of life. Furthermore, this must be
considered in an evolutionary perspective, since evolution is
fundamental to our understanding of living forms. This is a big
step that will be hard for many theoreticians to accept unless
the proposed principle can be based on causal processes that are
consistent with our most fundamental concepts of reality and natural
law.


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Analogy with physics

Ironically, at the most fundamental level of physics, there is
a direct analogy and possible basis for such principles, which
we shall refer to as autevolution, in terms of the “quantum postulate
of Niels Bohr (Bohr, 1958,
1961, 1963).
This postulate introduced a worldview in which a newly discovered
property of nature, which seems to be related to life, may be
the primary causative agent in determining physical conditions
at the quantum level. Wheeler (1981)
summarized, writing that:

“useful as it is under everyday circumstances to say that
the world exists ‘out there’ independent of us, that view can
no longer be upheld. There is a strange sense in which this is
a ‘participatory universe.'”

This phenomenon has been termed observer-participancy,
which we may interpret as a fundamental decision event.

While the findings of elementary particle physics have completely
changed the way we view the universe, classical descriptions of
nature are unchallenged at material levels significantly larger
than the “quantum of action” (systems with large quantum
numbers). Yet the manifestation of quantum phenomena is not restricted
to the scale of elementary particles, as is most often assumed.
Bohr wrote extensively on the implications for life
and “analogies with some fundamental features of the quantum
theory exhibited by the laws of psychology,” particularly
the “difficulty of distinguishing between subject and object.”
As with others who followed, Bohr thought that “free will”
might be linked with quantum uncertainty and that the connection
might go beyond analogy:

“Yet it may well be that behind these analogies there
lies not only a kinship with regard to the epistemological aspects,
but
[also] that a more profound relationship is hidden
behind the fundamental biological problems which are connected
to both sides … there is much which indicates that we are concerned
here with questions which closely approach the circle of ideas
of the quantum theory”
(Bohr, 1961).

Wigner (1981) wrote:

“a being with consciousness
must have a different role in quantum mechanics than the inanimate
measuring device” … “it will remain remarkable …
that the very study of the external world led to the conclusion
that the content of the consciousness
is an ultimate reality”.

The discussion did not end with psychology, however. Bohr was
of the opinion that “some amplifying mechanism” exists
in living organisms that magnifies the effects of quantum processes,
noting that the human brain and sensory system is developed “to
the utmost limit permitted by physics.” He wrote that:

“Indeed, the essential characteristics of living beings
must be sought in a peculiar organization in which features that
may be analyzed by usual mechanics are interwoven with typically
atomistic features to an extent unparalleled in inanimate matter”

(Bohr, 1958).

There has since been confirmation that sensory receptor cells,
in a variety of sensory systems and in a wide range of organisms,
operate as quantum mechanical amplifiers by maintaining a quantum
“non-equilibrium state” (Bialek and Schweitzer, 1985).
This supports Bohr’s amplification hypothesis, wherein life forms
are capable of retaining sensitivity to quantum indeterminism.
Wheeler asked:

“If the elementary quantum process is an act of creation,
is an act of creation of any other kind required to bring into
being all that is?”
Wheeler (1981)

Within this view, it would not be a great leap to suggest, as
did Bohr, that the phenomena of observer-participancy may be amplified
and expressed to various degrees within all living organisms.
An acceptable explanation of how such phenomena can become manifest
in macroscopic (e.g., organismic) systems through evolution would
seem to involve, as a minimum, a combination of the currently
accepted elements of evolution theory (e.g., heredity, variation,
and natural selection) with cumulative effects of observer-participancy.

This approach has been considered in the study of “dissipative
structures,” which seem to exhibit properties that can be
expressed by “only a few quantum numbers” (Jantsch, 1980).
From this view, the innovative, adaptive, and self-sustaining
properties of organisms are almost axiomatic, and it becomes reasonable
that living systems should exhibit self-regulation, self-organization,
and various degrees of control over the environment, as a predictable
result of non-equilibrium processes characteristic of living forms.
Jantsch, in fact, does take the view that life is fundamentally
“self-determining” and further suggests that the
decision-making ability of non-equilibrium systems may be related
to quantum indeterminacy, which dissipative structures are capable
of magnifying into “macroscopic indeterminacy.”

He points out that such indeterminacy should not be confused with
random uncertainty, and that it is fundamentally non-random and
non-deterministic (thus agreeing with Bohr). The theory of dissipative
structures seems to model many salient characteristics in the
holistic nature of living systems (autopoiesis, self-reference,
high malleability, system maintenance, etc.).


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The problem of disciplinary compartmentalization

Such theories suggest that there are grounds for serious consideration
of a universal concept of life as a causal agent. Such views appear
more to violate traditions of disciplinary compartmentalization
than acceptable views of the nature of reality. Thus, while
theories that are consistent with this worldview may be developing
rapidly on their own, the reluctance to integrate them with current
theories coupled with the lack of a commonly accepted epistemology,
leaves no objective tools for evaluation
. This lack of interdisciplinary
synthesis or development of consistency between fields, including
evolution and ecology, may forestall potentially important transitions
in thought.

New approaches in holistic science inevitably deal with concepts
of mind or psyche, an issue which post-Darwinian biology has traditionally
tried to exclude from concepts of causation. The roots of this
are mostly cultural and historical: One could argue that confusion
between psychological and material theories has been so damaging
to both, that it has been the more prudent course to keep them
apart. For many reasons, however, such arbitrary separations are
now crumbling (Roederer, 1985),
and we must find the means for scientific integration, including
an understanding of science as a process applying equally across
disciplines, even if those disciplines cannot yet be integrated
themselves.
I therefore provide two sections on epistemology
to provide a conceptual framework before proceeding with further
discussion of the causal processes
and implications of autevolution.


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Revised and reprinted from: Kineman, John Jay. 1991. “Gaia:
hypothesis or worldview?” Paper delivered at the American
Geophysical Union annual Chapman Conference, panel on epistemology,
March, 1988, San Diego, California. Chapter 7 In: Schneider, S.
H., and P. J. Boston (eds). 1991. Scientists on Gaia. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. 433p.

Please cite as: Kineman, John Jay. 1997. “Toward a special
and general theory of autevolution.” Boulder: Bear Mountain
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